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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues related to workers and families, and the
intersection of these two topics.
The first chapter examines domestic outsourcing of labor services in Germany. This chapter uses
a novel method to identify outsourcing in administrative data, and finds that outsourcing leads to
a 10-15% drop in wages that is persistent, lasting at least 10 years. There is evidence that these
wage losses are associated with the loss of firm-specific rents, suggesting that labor costs savings
are an important consideration in outsourcing. Finally, the increase in outsourcing activity is tied to
broader changes in the German wage structure, particularly increases in wage dispersion and occu-
pational sorting.
The second chapter analyzes the relationship between state abortion restrictions and the living cir-
cumstances of children living in these states. It uses data on 15 years of abortion laws in the US
connected to individual-level data on children and their family structure from the Census and Amer-
ican Community Survey, and finds evidence that low-income children who are born in states with
more restrictive abortion laws are more likely to live with a single mother than similar children
born in more permissive states. To address the endogeneity of these laws, data on nullified laws is
incorporated; nullified laws have no impact, indicating that it is likely the hurdles faced by women
seeking abortions in stricter states that impacts family structure.
v
The third chapter develops a new method to identify married couples in administrative worker
data that do not include a household identifier. Couples are identified using information on their
geo-coded location, name, gender and age; using German social security records, about 3.3 million
couples are identified. Consistency checks are provided using a subsample of the data for which
marriage information is available, as well as a comparison to a known sample of married couples
from the German Microcensus. These identified couples are then used to analyze patterns of relative
income within households, where strikingly different patterns are found for couples who work in
the same establishment and those who do not.
vi
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1Chapter 1
The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure
(with Johannes Schmieder)
1.1 Introduction
The last decades have seen a thorough transformation of the nature of the labor market, where large
firms rely increasingly on non-traditional employment arrangements such as outsourcing, temporary
or contingent work, offshoring and subcontracting. Across a wide range of industries, firms have
been focusing on their “core competencies” and hiring outside companies to provide services which
were once performed by their own employees, such as cleaning, security, logistics, human resources
and IT. Such outsourcing to business service providers potentially allows for reductions in wages
for the contracted-out jobs. The outsourcing firms are often traditional lead companies in sectors
such as manufacturing or finance, and typically offer the most attractive jobs, with higher wages,
increased job security, strong worker representation, and union coverage. Factors such as collective
bargaining agreements (Card et al., 2004; DiNardo and Lee, 2004) or efficiency wage considerations
linked to fairness perception (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Rees, 1993; Card et al., 2012) may lead to
wage compression within firms and rent sharing of firm profits, which in turn pushes up wages for
workers who would otherwise have lower paying outside job opportunities. Large employers may
then find it beneficial to reduce the number of direct employees who benefit from such wage premia
by outsourcing jobs to subcontractors. These business services firms compete fiercely with each
other for service contracts from large companies on price, and since labor costs are a large share of
business services firms’ total costs, this creates intense pressure to lower wages and reduce benefits.
Furthermore, workers in these firms likely benefit less from collective bargaining agreements and
protection from unions since they would typically not be covered by the same sectoral union of the
outsourcing company. Even though anecdotal and qualitative evidence for these changes in the labor
2market abound, research in the economics literature on this topic is quite limited.1 One problem with
analyzing outsourcing is that it is very difficult to measure and can usually only be approximated
using industry and occupation codes. Furthermore, even with such an approximation, the existing
research has relied largely on cross-sectional datasets on the worker level with almost no information
on the outsourcing firms and limited information on the actual jobs people do. Outsourcing however
inherently occurs on the job level, where certain tasks or inputs are moved out of the firm and
provided externally. Since jobs are typically not directly observed, it is difficult to identify the true
causal impact of outsourcing on wages.
In this chapter we analyze the phenomenon of domestic labor service outsourcing in Germany
using detailed administrative data on the universe of workers and firms.2 We document for the first
time in detail the rise of outsourcing of labor services over the last three decades in Germany, fo-
cusing in particular on logistics (i.e. truck drivers, warehouse workers), cleaning, security and food
services. We develop a new method for identifying outsourcing events at the time that they occur,
which allows us to observe wages for a particular job before and after the job is outsourced. Based
on this we provide credible estimates of the causal effect of outsourcing on wages, documenting that
moving jobs outside the boundary of the firm leads to large wage reductions. Next, we investigate
in detail whether the wage reductions we find after outsourcing can be explained with the loss of
firm wage premia and whether it is plausible that at least part of the reason that firms outsource is
that it allows them to avoid paying such rents. Finally, we consider the relationship between the
documented increases and impacts of outsourcing and the broad changes in the wage distribution
experienced by Germany over the last decades.
An important methodological innovation for this project is the development of a new method
of identifying a particular type of outsourcing which we refer to as on-site outsourcing. This type
1Weil (2014) provides a detailed, largely qualitative, analysis of the practice of domestic outsourcing and an overview
of the quantitative research in economics. He only lists two papers that estimate wage differentials between contracted-
out and in-house workers based on CPS data (discussed below) and only a handful of studies based on firm surveys
that measure the increase in the incidence of sub-contracting of labor services. The topic has received somewhat more
attention in the sociology literature, e.g. see Kalleberg (2000) for an overview.
2We use the term ’domestic outsourcing’ in order to differentiate it from offshoring, which is a form of outsourcing
that has been studied much more widely in the economics literature even though it is not clear that it is quantitatively
more important.
3of outsourcing refers to situations where large employers spin out a group of workers providing
a particular service, such as cafeteria workers, to a legally separate business unit, for example a
subsidiary or an existing business service provider. In these situations the outsourced workers still
work together and do essentially the same job at the same physical location, but under a different
employer. We show that such outsourcing events can be identified in administrative datasets using
worker flows between establishments. The basic intuition is that if a group of workers is contracted
out at the same time, this can be observed by following the establishment identifiers as well as
occupation and industry codes. For example, if we observe a group of workers splitting off from a
large bank in year t-1 and forming a new establishment identifier in year t with an industry code of
’cafeteria’, this is likely reflecting that the bank is outsourcing its cafeteria. This is further supported
if the workers who are leaving worked in food related jobs in year t-1 at the bank, and the bank does
not replace these occupations in the following year.
These instances of on-site outsourcing likely only constitute a small share of all outsourcing, for
example missing outsourcing events where all workers providing a particular task are simply laid
off and the task is sub-contracted to an external provider with different employees. However, on-
site outsourcing events provide a particularly powerful testing ground to analyze the wage effects
of outsourcing, since we are essentially following jobs over time where both the worker and the
work location remain the same, so that effects on wages can be attributed directly to the change
in the employment relationship without selection or omitted variable bias. We complement this
analysis with a broader measure of outsourcing, where a worker in a logistics, food, cleaning or
security occupation is defined as outsourced if he is employed by a business services firm. Using
both measures we find a dramatic increase in outsourcing in Germany that has accelerated in the
late 1990s and continues into recent years.3
Our main contribution is to provide cleanly identified effects of outsourcing on the wages paid
for outsourced jobs using three alternative approaches. We first show that workers who are out-
3This trend to vertical disintegration appears to be more widespread than just for the area of labor services. E.g.
Dustmann et al. (2014) document that final goods producers in the German manufacturing sector have been relying
increasingly on buying intermediate inputs from outside the firm and from abroad (offshoring) and are responsible for a
increasingly smaller share of the value added of final goods.
4sourced in on-site outsourcing events typically stay with the business service firm they are out-
sourced to for the following years, and their employment is similarly stable as for workers in the
same occupations and industries who are not outsourced. This allows us to interpret the wage effects
of outsourcing as the effect on the job level, free of selection. As a second method of estimating
the wage losses from outsourcing, we compare wages of workers in logistics, cleaning, food and
security occupations who are employed in business services firms with those employed directly by
other employers, controlling for individual fixed effects.4 The approaches in principle have vari-
ous advantages and disadvantages, but yield very similar results: After on-site outsourcing wages
for outsourced workers fall by around 12 percent within 5-10 years compared to the control group,
essentially the same wage differential we estimate using our other method.
Firms may choose to engage in these types of alternative employment arrangements for various
reasons. Subcontractors can provide increased flexibility for firms whose needs vary throughout
the year, or provide specialized skills or technology that would be costly for a firm to invest in.
Outsourcing can also provide cost savings through lower labor costs, if outsourced workers are ex-
cluded from wage premia or rents at the outsourcing firm. In order to test the hypothesis that the
wage losses of outsourced workers stem from being excluded from firm rents, we first estimate a
measurement of the establishment wage premium by implementing a full decomposition of wages
in Germany into establishment and worker fixed effects as in Card et al. (2013) - henceforth CHK
- and in the spirit of Abowd et al. (1999). We find that the establishment fixed effect of workers
moving to business service firms falls by around 10 log points, fully explaining the wage losses
at outsourcing. We also show that on-site outsourcing is associated with sharp drops in other firm
characteristics typically associated with rents, such as firm size and average pay of coworkers. Fur-
thermore, we show that wage losses are highly correlated with measures of wage premia at the
outsourcing establishment and are much larger when workers are outsourced from large employers
4This is the same method used by Abraham (1990) and Dube and Kaplan (2010), who use CPS data to estimate
the effect of outsourcing on wages. It is also similar to the earlier literature that estimated industry wage differentials
using individual fixed effects, e.g. Krueger and Summers (1988). The criticism of this approach in Gibbons and Katz
(1992) applies in the outsourcing case as well, which is why identifying on-site outsourcing as an exogenous (from the
individual’s perspective) shock is crucial.
5or establishments with high establishment effects. Finally we document that establishments that pay
above market wages or are covered by collective bargaining agreements are more likely to outsource
parts of their labor force. These findings suggest that exclusion from establishment wage premia is
a driving factor for the wage losses and likely part of the motivation for why firms outsource.
Germany provides a particularly interesting setting to study outsourcing. Over the last few
decades there has been a substantial increase in wage inequality, with significant wage declines at
the bottom of the wage distribution (Dustmann et al., 2009, CHK). These changes in the wage struc-
ture are in part explained by de-unionization, the erosion of the sectoral level collective bargaining
system, and the increased decentralization of the wage setting mechanism.5 However, as CHK
show, a significant portion of the rise in wage inequality comes from increased assortative matching
of workers employed together with others in the same or similar jobs, and low skilled workers being
matched with low paying firms, something which is not easily explained by de-unionization. On the
other hand, increased reliance on outsourcing, particularly of lower-skilled labor services and other
inputs, provides a natural explanation for this change, as lead firms move parts of their labor inputs
out of the core workforce and into highly specialized, lower-paying business service firms.6
We provide several pieces of evidence that outsourcing did indeed contribute to these changes in
the German employment and wage structure. In particular, based on the establishment-worker fixed
effects decomposition we show that outsourcing of cleaning, security and logistics workers alone
can account for about 10 percent of the increased wage dispersion in Germany, with equal parts
due to increased dispersion of the establishment component and increased assortative matching
of low paid workers to low paying employers. While we view outsourcing as a complementary
explanation to de-unionization for the change in the German wage structure and the increases in
competitiveness, we also believe that these two channels are likely closely intertwined, since on
the one hand weaker unions facilitated outsourcing decisions and, on the other hand, outsourcing
5See for example Dustmann et al. (2014) for a discussion of how the German reunification in combination with the
Eastern EU expansion lead to the reduction in collective bargaining coverage rates.
6Outsourcing it may also explain why unit labor costs in the German manufacturing sector declined even though
manufacturing wages remained relatively stable (see Dustmann et al., 2014): while large employers continue to pay
relatively high wages, they benefit from the drop in wages at their sub-contractors and suppliers.
6weakened the bargaining positions of unions and work councils. In fact, the increase in domestic
outsourcing may have put direct wage pressure on in-house employees in similar jobs, since these
employees are increasingly in competition with outside business service firms.7
The next section presents the data and institutional background, as well as a description of
our measures of domestic outsourcing. Section 1.3 presents our empirical results on the effects of
outsourcing on workers’ employment trajectories and wages of outsourced jobs. In section 1.4 we
provide evidence that firm decide to outsource in order to avoid paying establishment specific wage
premia. Finally section 1.5 relates outsourcing to the broader changes observed in the German wage
structure and section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing
1.2.1 Institutional Background
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while union coverage declined in many other countries, Ger-
many maintained high union density and relatively stable collective bargaining agreements, covering
around 75 - 80 percent (see Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Fitzenberger et al., 2013; Dustmann et al.,
2014). Germany features a somewhat unique collective bargaining system, the so-called “dual sys-
tem”, where wages are negotiated between employer associations and unions on the industry level or
on the firm level, often in close coordination with elected firm or establishment level work councils.
The close level of cooperation between the different parties appeared to lead to relatively high wages
and good working conditions, while at the same time avoiding costly strikes and conflicts between
unions and employers. However, the system was always based on contractual relations and mutual
agreements and firms were free to leave the collective agreements and instead set wages either in
firm level negotiations or without any agreement. Firms which do not leave the union contracts can
achieve additional wage flexibility through “opening clauses”, which allowed for wages below the
7For example, this is illustrated by the final report of the Harvard Committee on Employment and Contracting Policies
(2001), also known as the Katz committee, that investigated the situation of low wage workers at Harvard University. The
report noted in particular that “in-house employees [...] have typically been employed by Harvard service units that
operate on a fee-for-service business model and compete with outside contractors” and “outsourcing competition put
pressure on Harvard’s unions to bring wages down to the rates paid by outside contractors”.
7collectively agreed upon level. While workers can attempt to resist an employer who tries to leave
the collective agreements through strikes or the work councils, the success of this will depend on
the ability of the employer to threaten job cuts or even plant closings to move production elsewhere.
Starting in the early 1990s, Germany experienced a sharp decline in collective bargaining cover-
age rates and union membership as more and more firms opted out of the industry level agreements
and either did not have any agreements or any firm level agreements.8 Many existing firms left the
employer associations while new firms opted not to join them in the first place (see CHK). Dust-
mann et al. (2009) and CHK argue that this decline was kick-started by the decision of labor unions
to impose West German wage levels in East German establishments almost immediately after the
reunification. The large productivity gap essentially forced East German employers to leave the
collective agreements, which in turn led to firms in West Germany imitating them and leaving the
agreements as well. The increased pressure from globalization, the real threat of offshoring produc-
tion to Eastern Germany or the newly accessible Eastern European countries, and the high levels
of unemployment in Germany all provided West German firms with the necessary leverage to force
work councils and unions to agree to these changes.
While work councils have to be consulted for a wide variety of firm level decisions that affect
workers, this does not apply to outsourcing decisions and German firms are legally free to do so
at their discretion. In practice work councils and unions may try to fight outsourcing, but the suc-
cess will depend on the willingness of the core workforce to stand up for the workers affected by
outsourcing. It seems likely that the same factors that led to decreased union coverage likely also
facilitated outsourcing of parts of the workforce. On the other hand, as noted by Doellgast and
Greer (2007), outsourcing itself offers a way for firms to sidestep the unions, since even if a firm
is following a collective bargaining agreement, outsourced workers employed by a different sector
typically would not be covered by the same agreement. Furthermore workers in business service
firms are often not well organized and in many cases do not even form a work council.
Another factor that has facilitated outsourcing in Germany over the last two decades has been
8For example Dustmann et al. (2014) report that from 1995 to 2008, industry wide agreements fell from 75 to 56
percent, while firm level agreements stayed close to 10 percent.
8a steady deregulation of the temp agency sector (Vitols, 2004). The number of employees in this
sector subsequently increased dramatically since the early 1990s and the sector became more estab-
lished with many large temp agencies offering their services to other firms, thus making it easier to
outsource.9
1.2.2 Data
We use the Integrated Employment Biographies data (IEB) which represents the universe of social
security records in Germany over the time period 1975 to 2009.10 The IEB has been made available
through the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB). Employers are required to file a report for all employees who are
employed during a year. This report contains information on the duration of employment, the total
pay over that period, the employment type (full-time, part-time, apprentice), and a number of demo-
graphic variables (such as education, nationality, gender, and age). The pay information is generally
very accurate (since it determines the social security contributions) but top coded. The IEB also
contains information on benefits receipt from the unemployment insurance system. The data covers
all employment subject to social security contributions, but excludes certain types of government
employees and the self-employed. For our approach of measuring outsourcing it is important that
the data contains industry and occupation for every worker. Furthermore, since employers and in-
dividuals are uniquely identified through establishment and person IDs, it is possible to construct
complete employment histories for individual workers and to follow establishments over time. One
limitation is that the data only contains establishment, not firm identifiers.11
9It is interesting that other countries with very different institutional backgrounds also experienced a dramatic rise
in outsourcing. For example Autor (2003) argues that in the US the development of the “unjust dismissal” doctrine
that restricted the employment at will notion contributed to the growth in outsourcing to temporary help service firms.
Since Germany always had fairly strong employment protection laws, there was no legal change in this regard driving the
increase in temp services, although the existence of these laws might have spurred outsourcing once this was easier for
other reasons.
10See Oberschachtsiek et al. (2009)
11Multi-establishment firms typically have a separate identifier for each establishment they own, or they may combine
several establishments within the same county (such as branches) under a single establishment identifier, but establishment
identifiers do not span across multiple counties. See Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013a) for more details.
91.2.3 On-site Outsourcing
Although the IEB, like most data sets, does not contain any specific information on outsourcing,
we developed a method to identify a particular type of outsourcing using worker flows between
establishments. We call this on-site outsourcing, and it refers to cases where companies contract
out part of their workforce to a legally independent sub-contractor but where the same employees
continue their work at the same physical location. For example, in 2005 the Daimler corporation im-
plemented a large cost-saving program called “CORE” to focus on its core business competencies.
As part of this program it outsourced several of its in-house cafeterias into a legally independent
subsidiary company, which was at first fully owned by Daimler and later sold in parts to various
business service firms. The employees largely remained the same and still worked at the same lo-
cations, but were now employed by a different employer.12 As we argue below, since in the case
of on-site outsourcing the worker and workplace remain the same with the main difference being
the change in the employment contract, this allows for particularly clean estimates of the effects of
outsourcing on jobs.
We identify these on-site outsourcing events using worker flows between establishment iden-
tifiers, implementing a strategy similar to Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013a), which dealt with
classifying establishment entries and exits, and Muendler et al. (2012), which used worker flows to
identify employee spin-offs. Starting with the universe of covered workers as of June 30 in each
year from 1975 to 2009, we track workers as they move between establishments from year to year.
We define a cluster of workers to be a group of workers who were all employed in establishment
A in one year and then, in the following year, were all employed in establishment B; a cluster rep-
resents an outflow from establishment A, the predecessor, and an inflow into establishment B, the
successor. We create a data set of all such clusters between every pair of establishments in each
year.
12This description of the events is based on personal conversations with Daimler employees. There are many other
case studies describing similar events, e.g. Doellgast and Greer (2007) describe outsourcing in the automobile and
telecommunications sector in Germany, Dietz et al. (2013) describe outsourcing of airport workers in the U.S., and Smith
Institute (2014) provides several examples from the UK.
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On-site outsourcing events are defined using these clustered flows between predecessor and suc-
cessor establishments. A clustered flow at time t is considered an outsourcing event if the following
conditions hold: First, the flow must consist of 10 employees or more, to eliminate small flows that
may be a part of regular year-to-year worker movements. The predecessor establishment must have
at least 50 employees in the year prior to the flow, continue to exist in the following year and not
shrink by more than 50%, to ensure that the flow we observe is not due to an establishment closing,
severely downsizing, or breaking apart. The flow must also represent less than 30% of employment
in the predecessor in the previous year, so that we are certain that the outsourced employees rep-
resent only a small part of the predecessor’s business. If the successor is a new establishment (i.e.
the establishment ID appears in the data for the first time in year t), then we further require that
the clustered flow makes up 65% or more of the successor’s employment. Finally, we restrict the
successor establishment to have an industry code corresponding to a business service firm in either
logistics, food services, cleaning or security, and ensure that the predecessor establishment is not
a business service firm, giving us further confidence that these flows are likely to be outsourcing
occurrences and not spin-offs or other types of establishment changes.13 For all outsourcing events,
we call the predecessor establishment the mother, and the successor establishment the daughter.14
We also use this method to identify events where the daughter is a temp agency. Since temp
agencies can in principle provide many different labor services and are not associated with clear
occupation codes we find these on-site outsourcing events to temp agencies somewhat less clean
from an identification perspective (for example it seems more likely that these temp agencies would
also provide services to other businesses). On the other hand temp agencies clearly played an
13The Appendix lists the precise industry codes we use to define outsourcing and business service firms.
14While the outsourcing definition that we use does not explicitly exclude situations where a mother establishment
re-hires the types of workers who left the firm, we find that this is not typically the case. In Appendix Figure A.1 (a) we
graph the number of workers employed in the outsourced occupation at the mother establishment (i.e. for establishments
outsourcing cleaning tasks, this would be the number of workers who are in occupations labeled “cleaner”) in the years
surrounding outsourcing (which occurs between year -1 and 0). We find that this number drops sharply at the time of out-
sourcing and does not increase, indicating that these workers are not replaced. If our method were instead just capturing
layoffs or quits of groups of workers while the corresponding tasks still stayed in-house, then the mother establishment
would have to replace these workers with others in the same occupation. Appendix Figure A.1 (b) shows establishment
size before and after outsourcing, and while establishment size decreases slightly in the years before outsourcing, there
is only a small drop at the time of outsourcing and afterwards employment continues to be relatively flat, assuring us that
we are not capturing mass layoffs or other types of restructuring or downsizing.
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important role in the rise of outsourcing in Germany. We therefore focus in our analysis of the wage
effects of outsourcing on workers in FCSL (food, cleaning, security or logistics) tasks, but we do
also provide estimates for temp agencies separately and include workers in temp agencies in our
descriptive analysis on the rise of outsourcing.
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for establishments in the year 2000. For the first column,
we include any establishment that outsourced part of its workforce in an on-site outsourcing event
between 2000 and 2007. Column 2 includes all establishments who did not outsource during these
years. Outsourcing establishments tend to be larger and older. They are also more likely to be in
the retail, services or health industry sector. In fact, among outsourcing establishments the most
common industries are department stores and hospitals, but there are also a sizable number of man-
ufacturing plants, financial sector companies and transportation companies. Interestingly, in terms
of labor force characteristics they are very similar, for example the share of college, female workers
or average years of education is almost identical across the two groups. One difference is that the
outsourcing establishments pay slightly higher wages. Column (3) by comparison shows character-
istics for business service firms. Average wages are much lower, the firms are younger, and workers
are much more likely to be in FCSL occupations.
While this type of outsourcing was relatively uncommon in the late 1970s and 1980s, the mid-
90s saw a large increase in the number of outsourcing events to about 60-80 per year, as can be
seen in Figure 1.1 (a). This increase occurred across all five types of outsourcing events, which
follow similar time paths (Figure 1.1 (b)). The spikes in 1983 and 1988 in outsourcing of food
services are all due to department stores outsourcing restaurants in those two years. We cannot link
up our data to the company level across different counties, but it seems likely that in each of these
years a large department store chain decided to outsource all of their restaurants simultaneously.
We base this interpretation largely on the fact that the spikes are driven by outsourcing events with
exactly the same industry codes of mothers and daughters, as well as similar establishment sizes in
those years, while in other years there is a wide mix of industry codes among the different mother
establishments.
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1.2.4 Measuring Outsourcing using Industry and Occupation Codes
While our method for identifying on-site outsourcing has the advantage that we can observe the
event of outsourcing right when it happens, the disadvantage is that we are likely missing many
instances where outsourced workers are not moved together to a separate business unit, or when
outsourcing happens more gradually. For example we would not be capturing slower movements
of tasks to outside contractor that are not at the extensive margin (getting rid of workers of a spe-
cific task or spinning off entire units of workers) and changes due to reallocation of employment
shares among existing firms or between exiting and new firms (who may for example rely more
on outsourcing). This is, on the one hand, because the on-site measure of outsourcing relies on
worker flows that are somewhat extreme and therefore easily interpretable but also exclude many
gray cases. On the other hand, this is because on-site outsourcing represents a flow measure (new
outsourcing events) as opposed to a stock measure of the total amount of outsourcing in the labor
market.
In order to obtain a broad picture of the evolution of domestic outsourcing, Figure 1.2 (a) shows
the share of workers among all West German workers who are employed in establishments who
- based on their industry codes - provide cleaning, security or logistics services to other firms or
who are temp agencies.15 We do not include food workers here, since only the industry codes
from 1999 onward allow us to distinguish between business service firms and regular restaurants.
The figure documents a dramatic rise in outsourcing of labor services over the past 3 decades: the
number of outsourced workers in CSL business service firms and temp agencies has increased from
2 percent, to almost 8 percent of the West German workforce in 2008. The figure also breaks out
temp agency workers as a separate group, showing a stark increase to around 2.5 percent of all
workers in Germany in 2008.
In Figure 1.2 (b) we show the share of outsourced workers in food, cleaning, security and
15Business service industries for logistics include transportation, warehouse and storage. For food occupations include
canteens and catering. For cleaning, industries include industrial cleaning, cleaning of buildings, rooms and equipment,
street cleaning, chimney-sweeping, and scaffolding and facade cleaning. For security occupations, the industries used
were labeled security activities and security and storage activities. For a complete listing of occupation and industry
codes used, see Appendix tables A.2 and A.4.
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logistics occupations who are outsourced, where outsourced is again defined as working for a FCSL
business service firm or a temp agency.16 For example, a food services worker such as a waiter or
cook is considered to be an outsourced worker if she is employed in the “catering” or “canteen”
industry, or in a temp agency. The share of outsourced workers in these occupations has increased
substantially in all four groups over time. The most dramatic increase is the rise of cleaners working
for firms providing cleaning services: while in 1975 only about 10 percent of cleaners were working
for cleaning firms, this share has risen to almost 40 percent by 2008. Cleaning tasks may lend
themselves particularly well to being broken out of the normal firm hierarchy and, as they are often
very low-paying, may provide particularly good opportunities for cost savings through outsourcing.
There was also a substantial rise in the share of workers in security occupations who are work-
ing for business service firms, from less than 10 to almost 30 percent towards the end of the sample
period. Over the shorter time period there has been an increase in the share of food workers em-
ployed in business service firms, from about 16 percent to 26 percent.17 This may still under-count
the number of jobs outsourced in relation to establishment cafeterias, as establishment cafeterias are
likely to also employ a large number of workers (such as cashiers) who are not in food occupations
and who these figures thus do not count as outsourced.
Another way to evaluate the extent of outsourcing of FCSL services is by analyzing industries
which, although not in FCSL fields, typically employ some of these types of workers to provide
services for their establishment or workforce. Here we focus on retail, manufacturing, finance and
hospital industries. Figure 1.3 graphs the share of large establishments (over 100 workers) in each of
these industries employing at least one FCSL worker in each year. Starting with the top left graph,
for the retail industry, we see that over time fewer retail establishments employed workers in these
occupations. For example, in 1975, about 82% of retail establishments had at least one cleaning
worker on staff, while in 2009, only about 20% did. Presumably these retail establishments are
16To our knowledge this approach of using industry and occupation codes to identify outsourcing was first introduced
by Abraham (1990).
17Food workers employed by restaurants and hotels are omitted from these calculations, as they would be considered
neither “outsourced” nor “in-house”, but rather providing the main service of the establishment. We also exclude workers
in the “waiter, steward” occupation who are employed in the air travel industry, as they are likely to be flight attendants
and not relevant to this study.
14
being cleaned somehow, and so it is likely that these tasks have been contracted out to another
provider, rather than being done by workers employed directly by the retail firms. We see the same
patterns among manufacturing and finance firms. For hospitals, the share employing FCSL workers
has also decreased over time, although not quite as dramatically as in the other industries and mainly
during the 1990s and 2000s.
Both our measure of on-site outsourcing events as well as our analysis based on industry and
occupation codes showed a substantial increase in outsourcing over the past three decades. Es-
pecially since the late 1980s / early 1990s the growth has accelerated and reached quite dramatic
levels, with almost 8 percent of the entire German labor force now working for FCSL business ser-
vice firms and temp agencies. These findings are largely in line with the limited evidence from the
US and other countries, which covers much shorter time periods and more restrictive occupation
groups.18 This increase in outsourcing on the worker level also corresponds to the rise of large
business service firms. While we are not aware of systematic quantitative evidence, it is clear that
for example, food services firms that provide catering and cafeterias to other companies are now a
major multi-national industry, consisting of large providers such as Compass Group (500,000 em-
ployees worldwide), Sodexo (about 415,000 employees), Eurest, and Aramark as well as smaller
independent providers.
18For example, Abraham and Taylor (1996) used a survey question in the 1979-1987 Industry Wage Surveys and
found an increase in the fraction of work contracted out for janitorial, machine maintenance, engineering and drafting,
accounting and computer tasks, while Wooden (1999) examined the AWIRS establishment survey and found evidence
of a small increase in the use of contract workers in Australia from 1990 to 1995. Using the industry and occupation
codes in the CPS from 1983 to 2000, Dube and Kaplan (2010) found an increase in the share of janitors and guards
working for firms that provide labor services to other firms. Dey et al. (2010) investigated industry and occupation codes
in the Occupational Employment Statistics program and found that the share of workers in security, janitor, computer, and
truck driver occupations employed in industries that provide services to other firms increased from 1989-2000. Segal and
Sullivan (1997) and Autor (2003) document a sharp increase in employment in temporary help services between 1980
and 2000.
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1.3 The Effects of Outsourcing on Wages
1.3.1 Framework
The fact that firms outsource jobs that fall outside of their core business function suggests that they
are able to realize cost savings by doing so. Many of these are service tasks for which labor costs
are a large share of inputs; therefore, one way to achieve cost savings would be through lower
wages. It is, however, not immediately obvious why business service firms would pay lower wages
than the outsourcing firm. In particular, if the labor market were perfectly competitive, then wages
should simply be determined by the productivity of the worker and possibly a compensating wage
differential component. Whether a particular job falls directly under a parent-business or is instead
part of a subcontractor should not affect the wage in such an environment, and thus would not
allow for wage savings by contracting out this task. However, if labor markets are not perfectly
competitive, then outsourcing may allow for lower wages and thus labor costs savings by reducing
the non-competitive wage component.
In order to clarify this, consider the following simple wage setting equation :
ln(w jt) = δOutsourced jt + z′jtγ+ x
′
i( j,t);tβ+ ε jt (1.1)
where ln(w jt) is the (log) wage of job j at time t. Outsourced jt is an indicator function taking
a value of one if the employer is a business service firm and zero otherwise. Furthermore wages
are determined by characteristics of the job or workplace z jt , and individual characteristics xi( j,t);t .
Note that i is a function of j and t, since the same job might be held by different people over time.
A job is a set of tasks at a particular physical location, e.g. a cook in a cafeteria within a bank.
The employer may either be the parent company operating the workplace, such as the bank, or
a subcontractor that is hired by the parent company. Workplace or job characteristics that affect
wages could include working conditions or characteristics such as the amount of variety or stress
involved in the required tasks. The identity of the employer may affect the wage paid for a job,
separately from the characteristics of the workplace, for various reasons, such as if wages are set in
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a collective or individual wage bargaining setting or because of efficiency wage considerations. For
example, if wages are set in a collective bargaining process, then the profits of the employer might
affect individual wages through rent sharing. If the job is outsourced, then some or all of the rent
component of the wage may be lost, either because the profits of the subcontractor may be lower
(due to the more competitive environment) or because the workers may be in a weaker bargaining
position, for example because they are not covered by the same labor union or they might find it
harder to go on strike (since the subcontractor can simply be replaced).
The effect of outsourcing could be estimated by estimating equation (1.1) using OLS. How-
ever, in practice employer status (in-house vs contractor) is likely correlated with workplace and
individual worker characteristics. While panel data may help to control for individual character-
istics through individual fixed effects, it is very rare to have information on job characteristics to
satisfactorily deal with the omitted variable bias problem.
We provide two alternative estimates, explained in detail below, of the effects of outsourcing:
First, we estimate equation (1.1) using an event-study design around on-site outsourcing events.
Second, we implement the method used by Dube and Kaplan (2010) to estimate wage differences
between outsourced and non-outsourced FCSL workers using individual fixed effects regressions.
The approaches have various advantages and disadvantages and we view them as complemen-
tary evidence. On-site outsourcing provides a setting which mitigates the omitted variable bias prob-
lem described above, allowing for a clean identification strategy for δ.On-site outsourcing identifies
events where outsourced workers are likely to remain in the same workplace doing the same job but
under a different contractual arrangement. By following these workers over time before and after
the outsourcing event, we are implicitly controlling for job fixed effects. However, such events are
relatively rare and may not be representative of the bulk of outsourcing, since for example on-site
outsourcing may be more common among larger, more successful companies who might be paying
higher wages which can lead to larger wage losses after outsourcing and thus to an overestimate for
δ for the general population. On the other hand, wages after on-site outsourcing events may still
be constrained by wage setting mechanisms at the outsourcing firms. The other approach, based
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on individuals switching for unspecified reasons between establishments, should cover many more
types of outsourcing events. This higher degree of external validity comes at a cost, that there is
more potential for selection into who becomes an outsourced worker. While individual fixed ef-
fects control for permanent differences between workers, it may be that workers work for business
service firms after some kind of shock, such as a protracted unemployment spell associated with
human capital depreciation and loss in earnings potential. This could lead to downward biases in
the wage estimates. In addition, in this type of estimation, we have no information about job or
workplace characteristics. To the extent that job characteristics, such as non-wage compensation,
in general are worse at business service firms, this could lead to an underestimate of the true loss
in compensation or utility in the latter two approaches. We thus view the two methods as separate
important and complementary pieces.19 Next we will focus on how we estimate the effect of on-site
outsourcing, followed by the alternative estimates.
1.3.2 The Effects of On-site Outsourcing on Wages
Method
In order to measure the effect of on-site outsourcing, we require a comparison group of workers
at jobs which are not outsourced. In general workers employed at outsourced and non-outsourced
jobs may differ in many dimensions. In order to obtain a comparable control group, we implement
a matching algorithm. For each outsourced worker, we take the set of non-outsourced workers who
worked in the same industry and occupation in the year prior to outsourcing to be our potential
control group. We then estimate a probit regression of whether a worker is outsourced or not,
controlling for tenure and establishment size in the year prior to outsourcing as well as wages two
and three years prior to outsourcing. In addition, we restrict our sample to workers with at least 2
years of tenure at their establishment in the year prior to outsourcing. For each outsourced worker
19Both the on-site outsourcing and industry-occupation estimates may fail to capture the cost of outsourcing to workers
who are simply laid off and replaced by a business services firm. Such a focus on the effect of outsourcing on the worker
level would be closer to the displaced worker literature, while here we are interested in the effects of outsourcing on the
job level. Nevertheless in the appendix we discuss this type of worker level analysis, which we call Occupational Layoff
outsourcing, and provide some estimates.
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we then choose the non-outsourced worker with the closest propensity score to the comparison
worker.20
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.2 show worker characteristics for our analysis sample.21 The
characteristics of the matched outsourced and non-outsourced workers are quite similar, even for
characteristics that were not part of the matching algorithm, such as fulltime status and education.
We use an event-study framework, using the full employment histories of our treatment and
controls groups by estimating regression models of the form:
y jt =
10
∑
k=−5
δkI(t = t∗+ k)Outsourced jt +θi +ξ j +αt + x′itβ+ ε jt (1.2)
where y jt is an outcome variable and Outsourced jt is an indicator for whether job j was out-
sourced in year t∗. αt are year fixed effects to control for year-level shocks that could affect all
workers and jobs, xit are individual-level time varying worker controls, and ε jt is an error term. We
do not directly observe the job or workplace, however by restricting the sample to individuals who
remain at the same employer as in the year right before and after outsourcing, we can indirectly
control for job fixed effects ξ j. Each coefficient δk measures the change in the outcome variable
y jt for outsourced jobs relative to the non-outsourced control group in the k-th year before or after
outsourcing occurred.22
20We tested other matching specifications and found essentially the same results. For example, we matched on other
variables such as current wage, full-time status, and education. We also implemented a two-step matching procedure,
where we first found a control establishment for each outsourcing establishment, matching on establishment size and
mean wage; in the second step, we matched each outsourced worker to a worker in the non-outsourcing matched estab-
lishment, matching on wage and education. This latter procedure makes it harder to find very similar individual matches
in the second step, but the estimation results are very similar.
21The random non-OS workers were restricted to be age 25-55 and not in either the outsourced or the matched non-
outsourced groups.
22Alternatively to matching one can also use all workers in the potential control group for comparison, and adjust
the estimates using standard regression methods controlling for observables. One issue when doing so is that it seems
appropriate to allow for each cohort of outsourced workers (a cohort being workers who are outsourced in a single
year) and their comparison workers to have different year effects from each other. When we implemented regression
estimates using workers from a small number of outsourcing cohorts and allowing for such flexible year fixed effects,
we got virtually identical results to the propensity score matching estimates (where the control observation is implicitly
controlling for different year effects by cohort). However in our main specifications we have around 30 cohorts with 15
year effects each, which brings the total number of year dummies up to 450 and makes this computationally difficult when
we also try to control flexibly for other observables (state effects, industry fixed effects, individual fixed effects, ...). Our
matching estimates are more robust and can be implemented without computational problems. The second advantage of
creating a comparison group via propensity score matching is that comparing the raw means between the two groups over
19
Results
We start by comparing the trajectories of individual-level variables for outsourced and non-outsourced
workers in the years before and after outsourcing. Figure 1.4 (a) shows yearly earnings before and
after outsourcing for the two groups. It is reassuring for our design that the two groups show very
similar trends in earnings prior to the outsourcing year. The change in the slope betwwen t=-3
and t=-2 is due to the tenure restriction of 2 years prior to the outsourcing year. This also leads to
mean reversion in earnings in the control group from year t=1 onwards.23 However, at the time of
outsourcing the two groups diverge, and within 3 years after the outsourcing event the outsourced
workers are earning approximately 1700 euros less than the non-outsourced group, a difference of
about 10% of earnings. These differences are persistent, lasting for at least 10 years after outsourc-
ing occurs.
Yearly earnings can be decomposed into the average daily wage over the year times the number
of days worked per year. In order to see what drives our earnings losses, Figure 1.4 (b) shows the
average daily wage over time for the two groups. Again the two groups are quite similar in the years
prior to outsourcing. After outsourcing, the wages of the non-outsourced group continue to increase
steadily. Meanwhile, the wages of the outsourced group drop slightly; they start to climb again after
3 years, but never catch up to the non-outsourced group. In the years following outsourcing, the
wages of the outsourced group remain about 6-8 log points lower than that of the non-outsourced
workers.
In Figure 1.4 (c), we turn to the other component of earnings, days worked per year, but find
essentially no difference between the two groups. We also explored differences in fulltime status
before and after outsourcing and found essentially no differences between the two groups. It thus
seems that while outsourcing has a strong negative effect on wages and earnings of the outsourced
time is already quite informative, even absent of any regression adjustments.
23We conducted extensive robustness checks with different tenure restrictions. For example with a tenure restriction of
5 years, the ’kink’ occurs between year t=-6 and t=-5, which cuts our sample size but leaves the point estimates for the
wage and earnings losses very similar. We also experimented with different restrictions for when to include workers after
t=0, such as whether to include workers with zero earnings in a given year as zeros or to drop them (as is often done in
the displacement literature). While these different specifications affect the levels of earnings and the shape over time, it
has virtually no effect on the differences between treatment and control group.
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workers, there are basically no employment effects.
While we can follow workers over extended time periods, the further away from the outsourcing
event we compare outsourced and non-outsourced workers, the less likely it is that the workers are
still at the same jobs. This leads to the potential for omitted variable bias, since our data lacks
specific details on job characteristics. In order to more carefully control for job characteristics in
our analysis, we can follow jobs - rather than workers - over time, by excluding those workers who
change establishments, and hence leave their job, from our sample. However, we may be concerned
that workers at business services firms, who may have lower wages, are more likely to leave in
order to find a higher-paying job. In Figure 1.4 (d) we graph the probability of being employed at
the outsourced job. In each year prior to outsourcing, the dependent variable in this figure takes a
value of one if the worker is employed at the outsourcing establishment - the establishment at which
he was employed in time t=-1 - and zero otherwise. For each year after outsourcing, it takes a value
of one if the worker is employed at the same establishment as in time t=0 (for outsourced workers
this is the daughter establishment, for non-outsourced worker it is the same establishment as in
time t=-1). Figure 1.4 (d) shows that outsourced workers are leaving their jobs at a slightly higher
rate after outsourcing than non-outsourced workers - 3 years after outsourcing, 77% of outsourced
workers and 85% of non-outsourced workers remain at the same job.24 When we investigated the
job stability patterns by outsourcing type, we found that the gap in mobility between outsourced
and non-outsourced workers is largest for cleaning outsourcing events, which - as we document
below - is also the group for whom wage losses are highest. As this suggests that the workers who
experience the largest wage losses are most likely to leave their jobs after outsourcing, our method
may slightly underestimate the wage losses associated with outsourcing.
In Figure 1.5 (a) we examine mean wages for outsourced and matched non-outsourced workers
restricting our sample to workers who remained at the same job after outsourcing, effectively con-
trolling for job fixed effects. There is a small drop in mean log daily wages for outsourced workers
24The increased mobility among outsourced workers could also in part be due to ownership changes of the outsourced
establishments. Anecdotally it appears somewhat common that workers are outsourced into subsidiaries that are later
sold to other companies, which may be accompanied by a change in the establishment ID.
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right after outsourcing of about 1-2 percent, and wages remain essentially flat thereafter. This is
in sharp contrast to wages at non-outsourced jobs, which continue to grow at around 2-3 percent
per year in real terms. Thus over time outsourced jobs pay significantly lower wages, with a 20
log-point difference between the wages of the two groups after 10 years.
While the raw means are quite informative in our matched sample, there is the possibility that
selection and time varying variables on the individual level (in particular age) affect the changes
over time. For example, it could in principle be possible that in the non-outsourced group, low wage
workers are more likely to leave the labor force, thus creating a mechanical increase in wages in the
non-outsourced group relative to the outsourced group. The event study design allows us to easily
control for such selection by estimating equation (1.2) controlling for individual fixed effects as well
as year-level shocks, and by restricting the sample to workers at the same establishment as in time
zero, thus implicitly controlling for job fixed effects.
Figure 1.5 (b) graphs the δk coefficients from estimating equation (1.2) using log daily wage as
the dependent variable. The regression framework confirms the results from comparing the means:
outsourced jobs suffer an immediate drop in wages at the time of outsourcing and continue to decline
relative to non-outsourced jobs, ending up about 15% lower after 10 years.25
Table 1.3 summarizes the results for wages for workers and jobs for the full sample and by
daughter establishment type. This table uses a specification similar to equation 1.2, but, instead of
using individual dummy variables for each year relative to outsourcing, it simply uses three indicator
variables for the time periods: pre-outsourcing (includes the 6 years prior to outsourcing), short-run
post-outsourcing (includes the year outsourcing occurs and the following 3 years), and long-run
post-outsourcing (years 4-10 after outsourcing). In panel A we include all matched outsourced
and non-outsourced workers and verify that, for each type of daughter establishment, outsourced
workers suffer a decrease in log wages both in the short- and long-term of about 5.6% and 8.5%,
respectively, implying a large cost of outsourcing to the outsourced workers’ lifetime expected in-
25Results are similar if we include workers who change jobs, although the magnitudes are a bit smaller and there is
a small short-term effect on employment variables such as days worked and days working fulltime per year. Please see
appendix figures A.5 and A.6 for more details.
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come. Workers outsourced to cleaning establishments face the largest decrease in both the short and
long term, while logistics and food workers are impacted slightly less. In panel B we follow jobs
rather than workers by restricting the sample to only those workers who remain at their outsourced
(or non-outsourced) job. The results show that outsourced jobs suffer an even larger wage loss in
the long term, of about 10%, relative to non-outsourced jobs. The impact on jobs is larger than the
long-term wage impact on workers since in the long term outsourced workers can move out of the
outsourced job and to a higher-paying position.
The last columns in Table 1.3 show the wage losses depending on whether the business service
firm that workers are outsourced to is a new establishment or an existing establishment. The wage
losses are similar, with just slightly larger losses for new establishments, which could be due to
outsourcing events into new establishments being different along other dimensions.
1.3.3 The Effect of Working for a Business Services Firm
While the wage estimates using our measure of on-site outsourcing have a high degree of inter-
nal validity, they may be limited in their generalizability since this is not the typical outsourcing
experience for most workers. In addition, jobs that are outsourced in the circumstances identified
by on-site outsourcing may be subject to agreements between work councils/unions and the out-
sourcing employer regarding the wages of the outsourced workers making it possible that we are
underestimating the true effect of outsourcing on wages.
In order to obtain a broader estimate of the effect of outsourcing on wages, in this section we
follow the method by Dube and Kaplan (2010), where outsourcing is defined based on workers’
occupation and industry codes.26 Food, cleaning, security and logistics services workers are identi-
fied by their 3-digit occupation codes. “Outsourced” workers are those who are employed at service
contractors, i.e. establishments whose main business is providing services to other firms, identi-
26Dube and Kaplan restricted their analysis to janitors and security guards; we additionally analyze the effect of
outsourcing on workers in food and logistics occupations. The approach in Dube and Kaplan is in turn based on Abraham
(1990). While both use CPS data, Abraham did not control for selection, while Dube and Kaplan use the short panel
structure of the CPS to estimate specifications with individual fixed effects and thus control, in part, for selection into
outsourcing.
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fied by their industry codes, while non-outsourced workers are those who are employed in-house to
provide services to a firm. We take the universe of workers in FCSL occupations and estimate an
equation of the form:
ln(wit) = γOutsourcedit +θi +αt + x′itβ+ εit (1.3)
where wit is the daily wage of worker i in year t, Outsourcedit is an indicator variable that takes
a value of one if the worker is employed at a business services firm in time t and zero otherwise, αt
account for year-level shocks that affect all workers, and individual fixed effects θi control for fixed
and xit for time varying individual characteristics.27 We also control for a dummy for whether a
worker is employed fulltime or parttime, but this makes little difference and our results are virtually
identical when we drop parttime workers. Using this method, we identify the impact of outsourcing
on wages using the movement of food, cleaning, security and logistics workers between outsourced
and non-outsourced status, rather than through the timing of outsourcing as in the on-site outsourc-
ing analyses.
The drawback of this type of estimation is that we cannot control - either directly or indirectly
- for workplace characteristics or job conditions, which may differ for outsourced and in-house
jobs.28 Thus a negative effect of outsourcing on wages could, in part, be the result of worse working
conditions for jobs with business services firms compared to in-house jobs. In addition, if workers
are more likely to move to business services firms after experiencing a negative shock that would
also affect their wages, then there may be issues of selection into outsourcing that are not controlled
for by individual fixed effects.
Results are shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.3. We find that workers in FCSL occupations
27In the food regressions, we omit workers employed by restaurants and cafes because they would not be considered
outsourced nor to be providing services to a firm, since food services is the firm’s main business. In addition, while the
logistics, cleaning and security regressions were run using all years of data from 1975 to 2009, food regressions started
in 1999 because before then, industry codes did not differentiate between canteens, catering and restaurant industries.
28Berlinski (2008)uses the Contingent Workers and Alternative Employment Arrangements supplement to the CPS,
which contains information on industry of assignment for workers employed by contract firms, and thus can estimate
the effect of outsourcing on wages controlling in part for job conditions. However, because his data is a repeated cross-
section and not a panel, he cannot control for selection into outsourcing; in addition, the sample contains less than 100
outsourced workers.
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employed in business services firms have wages that are about 12% lower than non-outsourced
workers in the same occupations. Cleaning workers face the largest losses from being outsourced,
a deficit of 18%, while security workers face a 12% loss. Food and logistics workers at business
services firms have wages that are about 7% lower than those employed in-house.
1.4 Do Firms Outsource to Exclude Workers from Rents?
There are three primary reasons why a firm may choose to outsource.29 The first is increased
flexibility - if a firm’s labor input needs vary throughout the year, they may prefer to subcontract
for these workers rather than either hiring and firing workers throughout the year or hiring the
number of workers needed for the busy season, who then remain idle when the workload decreases.
The second is comparative advantage - the firm may require a service which involves specialized
skills or technology, which could be expensive for an individual firm to investment in. In this
case they may prefer to work with a contractor, who can take advantage of economies of scale
and invest in the needed technologies which could be used for a large number of clients. Finally,
outsourcing could provide cost savings, in particular on labor inputs. Firms may be constrained in
their wage-setting for various reasons. For example, they may be required to pay higher wages to all
employees because of collective bargaining agreements, which are typically set at the industry level
in Germany. Alternatively, firms may pay efficiency wages to some workers for various reasons.
At larger firms workers may be hard to monitor, and so higher wages may discourage shirking. At
firms that employ a large number of high-skilled, high-wage workers, lower-skilled workers may
receive a wage premium in the interest of fairness or equity. Outsourcing provides a way for firms
to get around these constraints: by moving these jobs outside the boundary of the firm, they can be
excluded from receiving these wage premia or rents.
In this section we show that outsourcing is associated with a loss of firm rents, and provide
pieces of evidence suggesting that firms do in fact outsource in order to avoid paying establish-
ment level wage premia. We start by providing a measurement of firm wage premia, following the
29For a discussion of these also see Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Houseman (2001).
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methodology of Abowd et al. (1999) and CHK. We show that, consistent with the rent-exclusion
hypothesis, these wage premia are lower for outsourced workers. In addition, other establishment
characteristics typically associated with wage premia fall sharply after on-site outsourcing. Next,
we show that the wage losses are highest among establishments with characteristics typically as-
sociated with paying larger wage premia. And third, we show that establishments that pay higher
wage premia or are covered by collective bargaining agreements are more likely to outsource labor
services.
1.4.1 Estimating the Loss in Firm Rents Using AKM Decomposition
To start, we follow Abowd et al. (1999) and CHK and estimate a full worker - establishment fixed
effect decomposition using the universe of social security data in Germany:
ln(wit) = ψJ(i,t)+θi +αt + x′itβ+ εit , (1.4)
where ψJ(i,t) represents a vector of establishment fixed effects, θi a vector of individual fixed effects
and αt and Xitβ are year effects and time varying observables. We closely follow CHK in the
estimation of this model.30 First, we impute wages above the social security maximum in Germany
using their algorithm. Like CHK, we estimate the model on all fulltime male workers, but rather
than breaking the data up into different periods, we pool the entire time period 1979 to 2009, which
covers around 480 million observations.31 The establishment and worker fixed effects are only
separately identified within a connected set of establishments which are linked through workers
30Estimating the model is computationally challenging even on modern computers. To make this more manageable
we only run the estimation on the subset of individuals who switch employers, which provides unbiased estimates with a
negligible loss in efficiency (see CHK). This allows us to calculate the establishment fixed effects which can then be used
to calculate person and establishment effects for the whole sample. Even then, we estimate that around 200GB or RAM
would be necessary to estimate this using a conjugent gradient algorithm like a2reg, which is not available to us at the
research data center of the IAB. Instead we used the Stata tool gpreg (written by us), based on Guimaraes and Portugal
(2010), which is a slow but much more memory efficient algorithm.
31Breaking the sample up into separate pieces has obvious computational advantages, but also allows establishments
to have different fixed effects in different years. Since for some of our analysis in the next sections we are interested
in following workers over time after outsourcing, we want to have AKM effects that are comparable across all periods,
otherwise there would be large jumps at the transitions from one period to the next. In practice this does not make a
significant difference to our results.
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moving between them.32 We therefore restrict our analysis to this largest connected group, which
in our data covers around 90 percent of observations. Identification of the AKM model requires
that workers do not move across establishments in a way that is systematically related to individual
productivity shocks or trends. The underlying assumptions are discussed in detail in CHK, who
provide various tests suggesting that these assumptions do indeed seem to be justified.
The estimated establishment fixed effect - which we refer to as “AKM effect” - provides a
measurement of the wage premium provided by each establishment. The effect of outsourcing on
wages is reflected in this decomposition as the average difference in establishment fixed effects
between an outsourced and a non-outsourced worker:
E
[
ψJ(i,t)|outsourcedi,θi,αt ,Xit
]−E [ψJ(i,t)|non−outsourcedi,θi,αt ,Xit] (1.5)
To compute the difference we take all workers working FCSL occupations and regress the estimated
establishment fixed effects ψˆJ(i,t) on a dummy for working at a business service firm or temp agency,
as well as year dummies and time varying observables.33 Results are shown in panel A of Table
1.4. We find that overall, FCSL workers who are outsourced tend to be employed at firms with with
lower wage premia - their AKM effect is about 16 log points lower than FCSL workers who are not
at business service firms or temp agencies. This is fairly consistent across occupation types - we
see the largest difference for security workers (27 log points) and the smallest for logistics (12 log
points), but all are negative and significant.
In panel B we include individual fixed effects. These estimates can be interpreted as the dif-
ference in AKM effects between establishments where workers are actually moving between out-
sourced and non-outsourced jobs. Here the loss in AKM effect for workers at BSFs and temp
agencies is slightly smaller, but still negative and significant. Overall for FCSL workers, after con-
trolling for individual fixed effects, being employed by a business service or temp firm is associated
32In the on-site outsourcing sample all observations are in the connected group, which is not surprising since at baseline
all workers are employed at relatively large establishments.
33We include age, age squared, and age cubed, and interact these variables with dummy variables for different levels
of education.
27
with a 10 log point loss in AKM effect, implying an approximately 10 percentage points lower wage
premium, with losses ranging from 18 log points for security workers to 7.8 log points for cleaners.
1.4.2 Establishment Characteristics after On-site Outsourcing
If exclusion from firm rents is the primary driver of wage losses for outsourced jobs, then we would
expect outsourced workers to move from higher-rent firms to lower-rent firms. To test this, we
analyze the characteristics of the establishments employing outsourced and matched non-outsourced
workers in the years before and after an on-site outsourcing event. In particular, we look at the
characteristics typically associated with rents - firm size, average wage, and our measure of the
establishment wage premium, the AKM effect
Figure 1.6 shows employer characteristics before and after on-site outsourcing, for whatever
establishment they are employed at in each year. Panel (a) shows employer size before and after
outsourcing. Outsourced and non-outsourced workers work in relatively similarly sized establish-
ments, although the outsourced workers experienced a slightly declining trend in employer size in
the years up to the outsourcing event. The outsourced jobs experience a dramatic drop in employ-
ment size of their employer in year 0 to about 100 workers. In the years following outsourcing we
see that establishment size rises slowly for both groups. This is because workers who leave their
establishment - and therefore their job - are removed from our sample. Workers may be more likely
to stay at larger firms and therefore as the workers at smaller establishments leave over time, the
average establishment size in our sample goes up.
Figure 1.6 (b) graphs results for the average (log daily) wage at the establishments where the
workers in the two groups are employed. While the pre-outsourcing levels match well, after the
outsourced workers leave, the average wage at the establishment in which they are employed drops
substantially, by about 20%.
Mean establishment wages are determined by a number of factors, such as the average skill,
education level, and experience in the establishment. An establishment could pay high average
wages but these might be entirely explained by the high skill level of its workers and relative to
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this skill level the wages may actually be below average. To get a better measure of the pay policy
of an establishment, in graph (c), we show the average of the AKM effect for the establishment
at which each outsourced and matched non-outsourced worker is employed in each year. Before
outsourcing, both groups of workers were employed at firms with similar AKM effects, but the
outsourced workers move to firms with much lower AKM effects at the time of outsourcing, and
remain at lower-AKM effect firms in the years that follow. In fact, the AKM effect drops by about
10 log points at the time of outsourcing, similar in size to the long-term wage decrease that we see
for outsourced workers.
1.4.3 Wage Losses by Establishment Characteristics
If the loss of firm rents is indeed the primary driver of wage losses for outsourced jobs, then it is
likely that those with the most to lose - those coming from establishments with the highest wage
premia - would suffer the biggest drop in wages upon outsourcing. To test whether this is indeed the
case, we divide our sample into groups based on the characteristics of the outsourcing establishment
(the establishment at time -1) most associated with firm rents.
Figure 1.7 (a) shows the effects of outsourcing separately for establishments in the top and
bottom quartile of the establishment size distribution (within the matched establishments). Jobs
outsourced by the smaller establishments (in the bottom quartile) experience significantly smaller
wage losses in every year. For example, 5 years after outsourcing, jobs outsourced from the smallest
establishments experienced wages about 8% lower relative to year -1 and compared to the compar-
ison group, while those that came from the largest establishments had losses of about 14%.
Similarly, Figure 1.7 (b) shows the effects by the mean wage of the outsourcing establishment,
again comparing the first with the fourth quartile. Jobs outsourced by establishments located at
the bottom of the (establishment level) wage distribution show less dramatic wage losses relative
to those that came from establishments in the top quartile. Figure 1.7 (c) shows the wage losses
separately for jobs outsourced from establishments with the top and bottom establishment AKM
effect. Jobs outsourced from high-AKM effect establishments saw a much more dramatic loss in
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the short term, although the long-term effects are similar.
In Table 1.5 we show the losses in AKM effects by quartiles of the AKM distribution prior to
outsourcing34. The table highlights that workers in the highest quartile have larger losses in AKM
effects. For example the highest quartile of logistics workers loses around 14 log points, while the
lowest only around 2. Similarly for cleaning workers, the highest quartile losses are around 3.5
times the size of the lowest quartile losses.
1.4.4 Propensity to Outsource
Finally, we turn to the question of which type of firms are most likely to outsource their service
workers.We start by creating a definition of outsourcing that is more general than our on-site out-
sourcing definition. In particular, it will capture situations where an establishment lays off all of
its workers providing a particular service - either logistics, cleaning, security or food services -
either in one large layoff event or over a few years. We say that, for example, generalized outsourc-
ing of cleaning services has occurred when an establishment loses the last of its cleaning workers,
conditional on having at at least 5 workers in cleaning occupations in the last 5 years and on not
downsizing by more than 50 percent. More specifically, an establishment is said to have outsourced
in time t if:
• it does not employ and workers in cleaning occupations in time t
• it employed at least 1 cleaning worker in time t− 1, and at some point in the last 5 years it
employed at least 5 such workers
• the establishment had at least 50 employees in time t−1, and its size did not shrink by 50%
or more between time t−1 and t
• the establishment is not in an industry associated with cleaning
34The quartiles are employment weighted and conditional on being in our treatment and control group prior to out-
sourcing. Thus even the lowest quartile reflects AKM effects relatively high compared to the average business service
firm.
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We also only keep the earliest instance of cleaning outsourcing for any establishment. Generalized
outsourcing of food, logistics and security services is defined analogously.35
Using this definition, we can analyze whether establishment characteristics typically associated
with higher firm rents are associated with outsourcing. Results of our analysis are presented in
Table 1.6. In these regressions, observations are at the establishment-year level, and the dependent
variable takes a value of 1 if the establishment experienced either an on-site outsourcing event or a
generalized outsourcing in the following year, and zero otherwise. The sample is restricted to those
establishments who are “eligible” to outsource (i.e. they have at least 50 employees) and excludes
East Germany prior to 1997. All regressions include state fixed effects to account for regional
variations in outsourcing, year fixed effects to control for shocks that may affect all firms in a year,
and controls for broad industry categories to account for differences across types of industries in the
propensity to outsource. We augment our data with information from the IAB Establishment Panel
Survey, an annual survey of approximately 16,000 employers which has taken place since 1993.
Columns (1) through (4) include all establishments in the sample, while columns (5) through (7)
include only those establishments that are included in the Establishment Panel Survey. The indepen-
dent variables all provide different correlates or measures of establishment wages or rents. Larger
establishments and those with a higher estimated AKM effect are more likely to outsource, while
the coefficient on log average establishment wage is positive, but insignificant. The wage premium
paid to FCSL workers - calculated as the average wage paid to workers in FCSL occupations at the
establishment divided by the average wage paid to FCSL workers employed at business service or
temp firms in the same county and year - is also positive and significant, indicating that those estab-
lishments that may save more money in wages by outsourcing their FCSL to a business service firm
are likely to do so. The Establishment Panel Survey asked respondents whether they were bound
by a collective agreement; those who replied yes are also more likely to outsource FCSL workers,
35This definition may be best suited for cleaning, logistics and security outsourcing, which are services that an estab-
lishment is likely to need whether they hire the workers directly or contract these services from another provider. Food
services are less clear - when a firm lays off its cooks and waiters, it may be that these services are being provided by
an outside vendor, or that the firm has decided to close down the cafeteria altogether. Here we include food outsourcing
events, but excluding them does not affect the results.
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conditional on year, industry and state. In addition, establishments that responded that they paid
wages above the collectively agreed scale were also more likely to outsource. While one should be
cautious to interpret this evidence as causal, we view Table 1.6 as providing supporting evidence for
our hypothesis regarding firm rents and outsourcing by documenting the correlation between char-
acteristics associated with higher firm rents - in particular the firm AKM effect and participation in
a collective agreement - and increased likelihood of outsourcing.
While the previous evidence suggests that firms are more likely to outsource when they pay
high wage premia and there is potential for wage savings, this does not explain why outsourcing
has increased over time. A possible reason is that over time new business service firms have been
entering the market competing for contracts. As the environment became more competitive between
business service firms, this increased the pressure to lower prices and may in turn have lead to more
firms considering outsourcing as an option. Indeed Figure 1.8 (a) shows that the AKM effects of
business service firms have been falling substantially over time, with the newest entrants paying
much lower wage premia compare to both the earlier cohorts of BSF and non-BSF establishments.
Figure 1.8 (b) on the other hand illustrates how the market for BSF has become increasingly com-
petitive over time, by plotting the average county-level market concentration herfindahl index for
business service firms over time. For all types of BSF competition on the local level has increased
markedly, which in turn may have driven down prices and wages.
1.5 The Effects of Outsourcing on the Employment and Wage Structure
Germany experienced a substantial increase in wage inequality over the past decades, comparable
in magnitude to the changes in the US labor market (see Autor et al., 2008; Dustmann et al., 2009).
This has been partly due to a considerable decline in real wages at the lower end of the wage dis-
tribution (Dustmann et al., 2014). Furthermore CHK documented that a large share of the increase
was driven by increased dispersion of establishment wage premia - as measured by the AKM effect
- as well as stronger assortative matching between workers and firms. While CHK and Dustmann
et al. (2014) mention outsourcing as a possible channel, their empirical evidence focuses on de-
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unionization as the driving force behind these changes. Our results support the importance of the
former channel, and in this section we explore the extent to which outsourcing may have been a
contributor to these broad changes in the wage structure.
1.5.1 Decoupling of Wages in Labor Services
Dustmann et al. (2014) document a dramatic decline of real wages at the lower end of the wage
distribution since the early 2000s. After a decade of stagnation between 1990 to 2000, real wages at
the 15th percentile fell by around 10 percent between 2000 and 2008.36 This pattern is also apparent
among the labor service occupations we study in this chapter: Figure 1.9 (a) shows the evolution of
real wages in cleaning, security and logistics (CSL) occupations from 1975 to 2009.37 The figure
shows that real wages in CSL occupations moved in tandem with wages in other occupations until
around 1990. Even for cleaners, where mean wages were 50 log points lower during the early period,
wages grew at approximately the same rate as for the other occupations. This pattern changed
markedly from around 1990 onwards, when wage growth for CSL occupations decoupled from the
general wage evolution: While wage growth began to slow considerably across all occupations since
1990 and essentially stagnated over the past 10 years, real wages in CSL occupations declined by
a remarkable 20 log points over the past 20 years. It is noteworthy that this decoupling occurred at
the same time as the general rise in outsourcing shown in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.9 (b) provides further suggestive evidence that outsourcing is part of the explanation
for this decoupling. The figure shows wages for outsourced (working for business service firms /
temp agencies) and non-outsourced workers in CSL occupations as well as for other occupations.
Both outsourced and non-outsourced wages move in parallel with the general wage evolution until
1990. From 1990 onward CSL wages diverge, but more so for outsourced jobs. This is consistent
with the explanation that outsourcing allowed firms to indirectly cut wages for labor services by a
substantial amount. The fact that wages for non-outsourced CSL workers also fell on the one hand
36This decline has been even more pronounced in non-tradable sectors and tradable services, where real wages at the
15th percentile already started to fall in the mid 1990s and then decreased by 10 to 15 percent.
37Since we can only identify food business service firms in the industry codes since 1999, we do not separate out food
workers for this part of the analysis.
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is likely a selection effect, where the establishments with the highest wage premia are most likely
to outsource and on the other hand may be because the threat of outsourcing allowed employers to
cut wages to non-outsourced workers.
The role of establishment wage premia for CSL wages is illustrated in Figure 1.9 (c), which
shows the estimated AKM effects for CSL and other occupations. Decoupling is very apparent in
these graphs as well: AKM effects for cleaning and security workers are around 7 log points lower
in 1975 compared to the other occupations, but move in parallel until 1990, when they begin to
rapidly fall until the gap is more than 20 log points in 2009. For logistics workers the pattern is even
more striking, since until 1990 the AKM effects for logistics workers were essentially identical to
average AKM effects in the general population but then began to diverge sharply during the 1990s
and 2000s to a gap of around 15 log points. In other words, while in the 1970s and 1980s logistics
workers were employed in firms that paid the average wage premium in the economy, in the late
2000s they are employed in firms paying around 15 percent lower wages.
Figure 1.9 (d) shows the evolution of AKM effects broken up by outsourcing status. While
outsourced workers in CSL occupations always worked at establishments that paid significantly
lower wage premia, the differential remained roughly constant until 1990. From 1990 onward out-
sourced workers are working at increasingly worse firms, with wage premia declining by almost 15
log points. Non-outsourced workers are also losing wage premia relative to the general population,
with a gap of close to 10 log points by 2009. This suggests that, consistent with the results in sec-
tion 4, the firms that are not outsourcing are those that are already paying very low wage premia and
therefore face weaker incentives to outsource.
1.5.2 Occupational Sorting of Workers
CHK documented that workers are increasingly concentrated in establishments with homogeneous
workforces.38 Outsourcing provides a natural explanation for this: since business service firms are
much more homogeneous (for example, in the typical cleaning BSF about 60% of the employees
38This is only briefly discussed in the published paper. More details are provided in the NBER working paper version.
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are cleaners), moving workers from heterogeneous lead employers to BSFs that employ largely the
same occupations as the outsourced worker will increase the overall occupational assortativeness.
Figure 1.10 illustrates this mechanism for cleaning, security, and logistics occupations by graphing
the average Herfindahl index of occupational sorting over time for establishments that employ clean-
ing, security or logistics workers.39 While panel a) shows that cleaning workers are employed by
increasingly homogeneous establishments, with an increase of the Herfindahl index of occupational
sorting from 0.27 to 0.47, panel b) shows that there there has been no increase conditional on being
outsourced and only a very mild increase conditional on not being outsourced. There is, however, a
huge level difference in occupational sorting between outsourced and non-outsourced workers with
the former having a Herfindahl index of around 0.68 and the latter of around 0.28 towards the end of
the sample period. Thus almost all of the increase in occupational sorting among cleaning workers
stems directly from movement from the non-outsourced group to the outsourced group. Note that
this may even understate the influence of outsourcing, since the increase in the Herfindahl index for
cleaners at non-BSF firms might in part be due to increases in occupational homogeneity because
other occupations may have been outsourced. Panels c) and d) show very similar trends for security
workers. For logistics workers the increase in occupational homogeneity is similar, with one dif-
ference being that logistics business service firms are less homogeneous than other business service
firms but become more and more concentrated over time. The increase in occupational sorting for
logistics workers is thus due to both the shift towards business service firms and the increase in
concentration within the two groups.
1.5.3 The Distribution of Establishment Wage Premia
The main findings in CHK were that dispersion in AKM effects and assortative matching between
person and AKM effect increased substantially over the past two decades. Our results from the
previous sections suggest that outsourcing may explain these developments in several ways.
39The Herfindahl index was originally used as a measure of market concentration; we use it here as a measure of
occupational concentration within firms. For each establishment, we calculate the Herfindahl index as the sum of squared
occupation shares within the establishment. Establishments with workers in a large number of different occupations will
have a low Herfindahl index, while establishments made up of workers in only a few occupations will have a large index.
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On the one hand, outsourcing changes the allocation of workers across establishments, with out-
sourced workers moving to establishments at the lower end of the AKM effects distribution. Since
workers are moving from throughout the distribution to the bottom, this will lead to a mechanical
increase in the dispersion of the employment weighted AKM effects distribution. Furthermore since
workers in the affected occupations tend to be low wage workers, this will also lead to concentration
of low person fixed effects workers in firms at the bottom of the AKM distribution, thus increasing
assortative matching.
On the other hand, while this can occur even if the unweighted distribution of AKM affects
remains constant, there are good reasons to assume that outsourcing affected the wage premia of
establishments directly. First, if rents arise from profit sharing, then outsourcing would lead to
profits being shared among a smaller number of workers and AKM effects may well rise for the
non-outsourced workers. Second, if within-firm wage inequality is constrained due to collective
bargaining or efficiency wage / fairness considerations, then after a firm outsources these constraints
may be loosened and wages may also rise for the remaining high skill workers. Third, the creation
of new business service firms who likely pay low or no wage premia corresponds to the entry of
new very low AKM effect firms, thus spreading out the AKM distribution. And finally, outsourcing
may shift bargaining power away from workers towards firms, thus potentially reducing the role of
wage premia in firms where this is a threat.
In order to illustrate the extent to which outsourcing contributes to the changes in the AKM
dispersion and assortative matching, we follow the decomposition of log wages proposed in CHK:40
Var(wit) =Var(αi)+Var(ψJ(i,t))+2Cov(αi,ψJ(i,t))+Var(εit) (1.6)
We construct a counterfactual distribution of AKM effects, where we reweight workers in CSL
occupations so that CSL workers are kept at constant locations of the AKM distribution. E.g. if in
1985 x percent of CSL workers are in the 90th percentile of the AKM distribution, we reweight CSL
40For the sake of brevity we ignore the components associated with time varying observables Xitβ. As CHK showed
these components play almost no role in explaining changes in wage dispersion over time.
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worker in 2009 so that still x percent are in the 90th percentile. To construct these counterfactual
weights, we use the reweighting method of DiNardo et al. (1996), where the conditioning variables
are indicators for the deciles of the AKM distribution interacted with a dummy for being in a CSL
occupation.41 The results of this reweighting exercise are shown in Figure 1.11. The solid line in
panel (a) shows the variance of log wages by year, documenting the dramatic increase in inequality
since the 1990s. Panels (b) and (c) show the two components of this increase highlighted by CHK:
the variance of the establishment effects and the covariance between person and establishment ef-
fect. The dashed line shows the reweighted distribution that holds the location of CSL workers in
the AKM distribution constant at 1985 levels. Overall reweighting reduces the increase in the vari-
ance of wages by about 10 percent. As (b) and (c) show, reweighting reduces the variance and the
covariance terms, consistent with our hypothesis that outsourcing contributed significantly to the
increases in the dispersion of wage premia and assortative matching.
The reweighting procedure is in many ways a lower bound of the impact of outsourcing on the
wage structure. First, this exercise is holding the (unweighted) distribution of AKM effects constant.
As described above however, there are good reasons to assume that outsourcing may have affected
the AKM effects of establishments directly. While we believe these equilibrium adjustments of
wage premia to be important, modeling these would require a more structural approach beyond
the scope of this chapter. Second, our analysis here only uses CSL occupations, a relatively small
fraction of the German workforce. Outsourcing occurred for other low skill labor services as well
that we do not capture here. And third, while we focus on outsourcing of relatively low skilled
jobs, it is conceivable that outsourcing of high skill tasks lead to the creation of new high AKM
establishments, leading to increases in the dispersion of AKM effects and assortative matching at
the upper end of the distribution as well.
41There are several other ways one could construct such a counterfactual. One choice would be to simply keep the
share of outsourced workers constant. However since outsourced workers are displaced from high AKM firms, such a
simple reweighting scheme would reweight the outsourced workers to the non-outsourced workers later in the sample
who are at very low AKM firms. Thus this completely ignores the selection effect of who is outsourced. Our method
on the other hand simply assumes that without outsourcing the allocation of CSL workers across the AKM distribution
would have remained unchanged. Another alternative would be to simply use the point estimates for the loss in AKM
effects at outsourcing and add it back to the AKM effects of workers who are outsourced on top of the outsourcing level
in 1975. This leads to qualitatively very similar results as the results reported here.
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1.6 Conclusion
The labor market in modern economies has seen a fundamental restructuring in recent decades,
where lead employers are increasingly contracting out parts of their non-core labor force. This
transformation appears to be widespread across many occupations and industries, yet has received
limited attention from economists. Using high quality administrative data, we document that the
trend towards increasing reliance on outsourcing has also taken place in Germany, with a marked
acceleration in the late 1990s. While we focus on a subgroup of labor services where domestic
outsourcing can be measured comparatively well (logistics, cleaning, food and security services),
anecdotal evidence suggests that this is a widespread phenomenon affecting many types of labor
services and occupations, such as human resources, IT, call centers, and legal services. Analyzing
these changes more broadly will be an important area of future research.
This reorganization of the production structure changes the employment relationship for a large
share of the workforce. As workers are employed by specialized business service firm, they are
working for firms providing narrow products which are competing fiercely with each other for con-
tracts from lead companies. This creates pressure to reduce costs and lower wages, which likely
make up a large share of input costs among business service providers. It also drastically changes
the bargaining environment, as the price competition among business service firms makes it difficult
for outsourced workers to bargain for a share of the firm rents at the lead company. In this chapter,
we provide careful estimates of how this translates into lower wages for outsourced workers and
we find that across a wide range of measures, outsourcing reduces wages by around 10 percent 10
years after being outsourced. Our method implies that this is not due to selection of different types
of workers in outsourced employment relationships, or due to differences in the types of jobs that
outsourced workers do. Instead it appears that outsourced workers receive lower pay since they are
excluded from firm rents that are being paid to workers at the lead companies. This suggests that
the boundary of the firm is a crucial component for the wage setting and bargaining process. This is
supported by our finding that outsourced workers generally move to employers with characteristics
commonly associated with lower wage premia and that these characteristics can account for most
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of the wage losses.
It is difficult to know why firms decide to outsource part of their workforce. Our evidence
that firms that seem to pay wage premia to their workers are more likely to do so is suggestive
that saving labor costs is part of the motivation, but there are many other reasons that are likely of
similar or possibly higher importance, such as the comparative advantage of business service firms
in their specialty, cost savings through economies of scale, or gains in efficiency through market
pressures in the competitive environment of bidding for service contracts. It is even more difficult
to know what is driving the long-term increase in outsourcing. Changes in management philosophy
(e.g. a move towards emphasis on share-holder value in the 1980s and 1990s) may be of similar
importance as the development of new technologies that facilitate breaking out service provision.42
Understanding this is beyond the scope of this project but a fruitful area for future research.
Finally it should be noted that the welfare implications of increased outsourcing are not straight-
forward. Our findings suggest that the increasing reliance on contracting-out reduced the participa-
tion of these workers in firm rents and contributed to the sharp rise in wage inequality in Germany.
However, outsourcing also made the provision of these kinds of labor services more efficient, and
while diminishing rents, might have contributed to overall economic growth and possibly the im-
proved performance of the German economy over the past decade. The general equilibrium effects
may well have increased average welfare, while at the same time having hurt the affected workers.
1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Data Processing
We start with the universe of social security records from 1975 to 2009 in Germany, from the
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) database. The data is provided at the employment spell
level, and each record includes a person ID, establishment ID, employment spell start and end
date, wage, and various other information on the worker (birth year, sex, education, occupation),
42As an indication that outsourcing was simply not on the radar of managers and consulting firms, Appendix Figure
A.10 shows the frequency of the term “outsourcing” in the Google books database. The term outsourcing only appears in
the 1990s, coinciding with the sharp rise of outsourcing in Germany.
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employer (industry, county) and job type (full-time, part-time, apprentice).
1.7.1.1 Identifying On-Site Outsourcing Events
To identify on-site outsourcing events, we take one record for each worker in each year, using the
employment spell that includes June 30 of that year. If a worker has multiple employment spells
that include June 30, we use the spell with the highest wage. We then track year-to-year worker
movements between establishments, noting the number of employees that move between any pair
of establishments from one year to the next. We create a file that consists of these yearly flows
between establishment pairs, dropping any flow that consists of fewer than 10 workers.
A flow of workers from one establishment - the predecessor - to another establishment - the
successor - is defined as an on-site outsourcing event in year t if the following conditions hold:
• the size of the outflow from the predecessor establishment is less than or equal to 30% of the
predecessor’s total employment in time t−1
• If the successor is a new establishment (i.e. the establishment ID shows up for the first time
in time t), then the inflow from the predecessor to the successor makes up 65% or more of the
successor’s total employment in time t
• The number of workers at the predecessor in time tis not less than half the number of workers
at the predecessor in time t−1
• The successor is in either a food, cleaning or security industry (industry codes used are listed
in table A.3)
• The predecessor is not in a food, cleaning or security industry, more broadly defined
For all flows between establishment pairs that are identified as outsourcing events, we call the pre-
decessor establishment the mother, and the successor establishment the daughter.
40
1.7.1.2 Identifying the control group
We use propensity score matching to create an appropriate control group for the outsourced workers.
We start with the universe of outsourced workers (i.e. all workers who were employed by the mother
establishment in year t−1 and by the daughter establishment in year t, for all mother-daughter pairs
that were identified as on-site outsourcing events in year t). For each industry-occupation-year cell43
that contains at least one outsourced worker in the year prior to outsourcing (year t−1), we take all
non-outsourced workers in the same cell to be the potential control group. We restrict this sample
to workers with at least two years of tenure at their current establishment, and exclude workers who
changed establishments between time t−1 and time t from the control group. Using this sample, we
estimate a probit regression of whether a worker is outsourced or not, including controls for tenure
and establishment size in the current year (i.e. the year prior to outsourcing), and wages in the two
previous years. For each outsourced worker, we take the non-outsourced worker with the closest
estimated propensity score as the control.
1.7.2 Alternative Outsourcing Definition: Occupational Lay-off Outsourcing
1.7.2.1 Definition
The methodology used to identify on-site outsourcing events is certain to miss many occurrences.
In particular, our method only finds outsourcing events where the outsourced employees are all
employed together by another establishment. This likely captures many events where entire units of
workers are outsourced to contracting firms, but it will not capture situations where an employers
lays off all workers who are providing a certain task and contracts out this task to a business service
provider. In this case the workers who are affected by outsourcing are laid off and may or may not
find jobs in similar occupations. In our data such outsourcing events should be represented as cases
where groups of workers of similar occupations are jointly leaving an establishment, but rather than
being employed together in the next period at a different establishment identifier, they are dispersed
43We use 3-digit occupation codes and the most detailed industry codes available: 3-digit codes in years 1975-1998,
and 5-digit codes starting in year 1999.
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among many other firms and possibly unemployment.
We call these outsourcing events occupational lay-off (“OL”) outsourcing and formulate an
alternative specification to identify these events. Instead of using movements of workers between
establishments, we look at the movements of certain occupational groups out of an establishment.
In particular, an establishment is said to have experienced a OL outsourcing event for a particular
occupation group, say cleaning, in year t if:
• the establishment loses its last cleaning worker in time t; that is, it had at least 1 worker in a
cleaning occupation in time t−1 and zero workers in these occupations in time t
• the establishment had at least 5 workers in cleaning occupations in any of the previous 5 years
• it had at least 50 workers in time t− 1 and did not shrink by more than 50% between time
t−1 and t
• the establishment is not in an industry related to cleaning
In addition, if the same establishment has multiple instances of OL outsourcing, we keep only the
first one. We define OL outsourcing of food and security occupations in the same way.
Figure A.8 (a) shows the frequency of occupational lay-off outsourcing events by year. These
occurrences are more common than on-site outsourcing events, with around 50-60 per year in West
Germany and increasing to around 70 per year in the late 1990s. The increase in outsourcing over
time is less pronounced which seems in particularly due to a large number of cleaning OL outsourc-
ing events at the beginning of our sample period as revealed in Figure A.8 (b).
The two spikes in food service outsourcing in 1983 and 1988 are also present in the OL out-
sourcing measures and likely due to the same events that explain the spikes in the on-site outsourcing
figures.
1.7.2.2 The Effect of Occupational Lay-off Outsourcing on Workers
While the wage effects of on-site outsourcing captures the impact of changing the identity of the
employer of record while holding job characteristics constant, the effect of OL outsourcing on wages
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must be interpreted differently. OL outsourced workers are groups of workers who are laid off
together with all other workers of their occupation and presumably replaced by a business service
firm, and the effect on their wages captures not only the cost of outsourcing but also the impact
of being laid off and potentially experiencing an unemployment spell, losing human capital, and
perhaps having to change occupations in order to find a new job.
In order to analyze the effect of OL outsourcing on workers, we need to modify our definition
of OL outsourcing slightly so that we can better identify the affected workers. Instead of allowing
the outsourcing to occur gradually over time, we require that it happens all at once. Specifically, we
say that a modified OL outsourcing of cleaning workers has occurred at an establishment at time tif
the establishment had at least 10 workers in cleaning occupations in time t−1 and has 75% fewer
cleaning workers in time t. In addition, the establishment must have at least 50 workers in time
t− 1. We also check years t + 1 and t + 2 and make sure that the establishment does not shrink to
less than half of its (t−1)-size in those years, and that it does not hire back 10% more of its cleaning
workers. Finally, the establishment must not be in a cleaning-related industry. Food and security
OL outsourcing events are defined analogously.
We repeat the process of using propensity score matching, described above, to find a control
group for workers outsourced in this type of event. In the interest of space, we present only the
regression estimates of the effect of occupational lay-off outsourcing on log wages and employment
in Figure A.9. In panel (a), we see that, similar to what we saw with the on-site outsourcing def-
inition, wages drop sharply relative to the control group after outsourcing. In this case, they fall
by about 8% and remain permanently lower. While the number of days worked per year starts to
dip slightly even before outsourcing occurs, at the time of outsourcing the number of days working
drops by more than 40 days per year, likely reflecting the fact that many of these workers experi-
ence at least some spell of unemployment after leaving the outsourcing firm. Days worked starts to
recover immediately, and after 10 years is only slightly lower relative to non-outsourced workers.
43
Figure 1.1: Frequency of On-site Outsourcing Events by Year
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Figure 1.2: Share of Workers employed by Business Service Firms and Temp
Agencies over time
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Figure 1.3: Share of Firms with any Food/Cleaning/Security/Logistics workers, by
Industry
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Figure 1.4: Employment Outcomes of Outsourced and Non-Outsourced Workers
Before and After On-site Outsourcing
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(d) Probability of working at outsourced job
Notes: The figures follow two group of workers: the first is a group of workers who are
outsourced between year t=-1 and t=0, while the second group is a control group of non-
outsourced workers. The control group was chosen by finding workers employed in the
same industry and occupation with similar tenure and establishment size in the year prior
to outsourcing, and have similar wages 2 and 3 years prior to outsourcing as the outsourced
workers. The figures show average characteristics of the workers in the two groups before
and after the outsourcing event. The wage graph uses the full universe of workers, while the
earnings and days worked graphs use a 25pct sample (to be updated using the full universe
of workers soon).
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Figure 1.5: Effect of On-site Outsourcing on Log Daily Wage of Jobs
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(b) Controlling fo Individual Fixed Effects and Year Dummy Variables
Notes: Sample restricted to workers who are at the outsourced job, ie at the same estab-
lishment as in time t=-1 in all years before outsourcing, and in the same establishment as
in time t=1 in all years after outsourcing. The figures follow two group of workers: the
first is a group of workers who are outsourced between year t=-1 and t=0, while the sec-
ond group is a control group of non-outsourced workers. The control group was chosen
by finding workers employed in the same industry and occupation with similar tenure and
establishment size in the year prior to outsourcing, and have similar wages 2 and 3 years
prior to outsourcing as the outsourced workers. The top figure shows average wages of the
workers in the two groups before and after the outsourcing event. The bottom figure show
regression estimates of the effects of being outsourced on wages, controlling for individual
fixed effect and year dummies. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.6: Establishment Characteristics of Outsourced and Non-outsourced Jobs
before and after Outsourcing
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Notes: Sample restricted to workers who are at the same establishment as in time t=-1 in
all years before outsourcing, and in the same establishment as in time t=1 in all years after
outsourcing. The figures follow two group of workers: the first is a group of workers who
are outsourced between year t=-1 and t=0, while the second group is a control group of non-
outsourced workers. The figures show average characteristics of the establishments where
the workers in the two groups are working before and after the outsourcing event. The
AKM effect is the estimated establishment fixed effect from a wage regression including
a full set of worker and establishment fixed effects using the universe of wage records in
Germany.
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Figure 1.7: The Effects of Outsourcing by Characteristics of Outsourcing Firm
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Notes: Sample restricted to workers who are at the same establishment as in time t=-1 in
all years before outsourcing, and in the same establishment as in time t=1 in all years after
outsourcing. The figures show regression estimates of the effects of being outsourced on
log wages and establishment AKM effect before and after the outsourcing event. The omit-
ted category is year -1. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The establishment
AKM effects are calculated using the method described in Card, Heining and Kline (2013)
using the universe of social security data for Germany (own calculations).
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Figure 1.8: Market Entry of New Business Service Firms over Time
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(b) Market Concentration of Business Service Firms by Year
Notes: The top figure shows the AKM effect (estimated over the entire duration of an
establishments existence) of establishments by the year the establishment was founded
(first appears in the data). The bottom figure shows the average county level index of
employment weighted market concentration among business service firms. The index can
be interpreted as the probability that two randomly picked workers at business service firms
in a particular year and county are working for the same firm.
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Figure 1.9: Decoupling of Wages in Cleaning, Security and Logistics Occupations
from General Wage Growth
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(d) Evolution of AKM Effects by Outsourced Sta-
tus
Notes: The figures show how wages in cleaning, security and logistics (CSL) occupations
have evolved relative to wages in other occupations. Panel (a) shows the log wage for the
different groups and panel (b) the corresponding akm effect. Panel (c) Shows how wages
for CSL workers have evolved depending on whether they are outsourced or not, relative
to workers in other occupations. Panel (d) shows the AKM effects for CSL workers by
outsourcing status and the AKM effects for all workers.
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Figure 1.10: Occupational Concentration (Herfindahl index) over Time for Clean-
ing, Security and Logistics Workers
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(a) Occ. Conc. - Cleaning Workers
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(b) Occ. Concentration - Cleaning Workers by
Outsourced Status
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(c) Occ. Concentration - Security Workers
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(d) Occ. Concentration - Security Workers by
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(e) Occ. Concentration - Logistics Workers
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(f) Occ. Concentration - Logistics Workers by
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Notes: The figures show the herfindahl index of occupational concentration in the establish-
ments where cleaning workers (a and b), security workers (c and d) and logistics workers
(e and f) are employed. While a), c) and e) show the overall concentration index, figures
b), d) and f) break it up by whether or not the worker is working for a business service firm
(outsourced).
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Figure 1.11: Decomposition of Evolution of Wage Dispersion, Actual and DFL
Reweighted
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Notes: The figures shows how the variance of log wages and its components has evolved
over time. Panel (a) shows the variance of log wages, panel (b) shows the variance of
the estimated establishment effect (AKM effect) over time, and panel (c) the covariance
between establishment effects and the individual fixed effect. The solid line is the actual
evolution over time, while the dashed line shows the counterfactual evolution if outsourcing
had remained constant at the 1985 level, where the counterfactual is constructed using DFL
reweighting (see text).
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Table 1.1: Establishment Characteristics in Year 2000 by Out-
sourcing / BSF Status
OS Estabs All Non-OS Business
2000-2010 Estab. Svc Firms
# Employees 832.47 169.20 125.35
(2,345.74) (383.46) (146.17)
Avg Wage in Euro 82.06 78.15 54.52
(20.70) (22.21) (19.63)
AKM Effect 1.48 1.44 1.27
(0.15) (0.15) (0.19)
Avg Yrs of Education 10.70 10.70 9.82
(1.03) (1.32) (0.83)
Share College 0.09 0.10 0.02
Share Female 0.43 0.42 0.36
Share West Germany 0.79 0.79 0.79
Firm Age in Yrs 16.42 16.53 12.36
Share Food Workers 0.03 0.02 0.06
Share Cleaning Workers 0.03 0.04 0.20
Share Security Workers 0.01 0.01 0.06
Share Logistics Workers 0.08 0.07 0.22
Industry Shares
Agriculture 0.00 0.01 0.00
Mining, Energy 0.01 0.01 0.00
Investment, Production 0.27 0.20 0.00
Consumption Goods 0.11 0.09 0.00
Construction 0.03 0.06 0.00
Retail 0.16 0.13 0.00
Traffic, Telecom 0.04 0.05 0.31
Health 0.03 0.05 0.00
Services 0.31 0.30 0.68
Other 0.03 0.09 0.00
Observations 855 73902 6295
Notes: Table shows mean of each variable with standard deviation
in parentheses. Data excludes East Germany prior to 1997 and
establishment with less than 50 workers. All characteristics as of
2000. Each outsourced worker was matched to a non-outsourced
worker based on wage, establishment size, industry, occupation and
tenure. Matched Non-OS establishments are where matched non-OS
workers were employed. OS and Non-OS Establishments are included
if they were involved in an outsourcing events between 2000 and 2010.
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Table 1.2: Characteristics of Outsourced and Non-outsourced Workers
Outsourced Matched Non-OS FCSL at FCSL not at
at t=-1 at t=-1 BSF/Temp BSF/Temp
Real Daily Wage in Euro 69.93 70.18 51.07 63.71
(29.47) (30.83) (24.80) (25.36)
AKM Effect 1.49 1.49 1.30 1.49
(0.17) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17)
Age in Years 42.29 43.67 40.25 41.87
(7.98) (9.72) (8.49) (8.43)
Female 0.45 0.47 0.40 0.40
Years of Education 10.16 10.22 9.93 10.06
(1.17) (1.33) (1.06) (0.89)
College Degree 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01
Living in West Germany 0.86 0.91 0.85 0.94
Working Fulltime 0.78 0.76 0.70 0.78
Tenure in Years 8.58 8.58 3.91 6.16
(5.80) (6.35) (3.83) (5.29)
Food Occupation 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.14
Cleaning Occupation 0.11 0.12 0.41 0.24
Security Occupation 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.08
Logistics Occupation 0.34 0.34 0.42 0.53
Observations 21195 20621 6412854 35201181
Notes: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. Columns 1-2 include
On-Site Outsourced and matched Non-Outsourced workers age 25-55 with at least 2 years of
tenure in year before outsourcing. Statistics calculated in year before outsourcing. Columns
3-4 include workers in food, cleaning, security and logistics occupations who are age 25-55
and employed at an establishment with 50 or more workers. Column 3 includes these workers
who are employed at business services or temp firms, while column 4 includes these workers
who are not employed at business service or temp firms. All columns exclude East Germany
prior to 1997.
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Table 1.3: The Effects of Outsourcing on Log Wages
All FCSL Food Cleaning Security Logistics Temp OS to OS to New
Existing Estab.
Panel A: Effect of On-site Outsourcing on Workers
Post-OS short-run -0.056*** -0.048*** -0.11*** -0.069*** -0.039*** -0.15*** -0.044*** -0.074***
(0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Post-OS long-run -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.065*** -0.16*** -0.080*** -0.091***
(0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0046) (0.0098) (0.0043) (0.0050)
Observations 517662 158971 73064 83574 202053 97538 305315 212347
Avg Outcome Var at t=-1 4.14 4.02 3.95 4 4.37 4.37 4.11 4.19
Panel B: Effect of On-site Outsourcing on Jobs
Post-OS short-run -0.054*** -0.045*** -0.10*** -0.072*** -0.035*** -0.15*** -0.041*** -0.073***
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0018) (0.0024)
Post-OS long-run -0.098*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.059*** -0.16*** -0.090*** -0.11***
(0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0093) (0.0082) (0.0043) (0.011) (0.0038) (0.0048)
Observations 429949 134005 61276 69976 164692 72854 259434 170515
Avg Outcome Var at t=-1 4.14 4.02 3.95 4 4.37 4.37 4.11 4.19
Panel C: Effects of working for Business Service Firm (Dube & Kaplan 2010 Measure)
Working for Business -0.11*** -0.074*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.073***
Service Firm (0.00055) (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.00060)
Observations 36234249 1455432 10703132 3373983 20701702
Mean Outcome Var 3.81 3.76 3.43 3.95 4.15
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Std err are clustered at the worker level. Panels A and B use matched sample of OS and non-OS
workers. Panel B excludes workers who change jobs after time t=0. Time periods are 5 yrs pre-OS; 4 yrs short-run; 6 yrs long-
run. First column does not include workers outsourced to temp firms. In Panel C, food regressions include only workers in food
occupations; a worker is “outsourced” if he is employed in a food service or temp agency industry. Other samples and variables are
defined analogously. Workers at restaurants, cafes and hotels are excluded from food regressions. Restricted to workers age 25-55, at
establishments with at least 50 workers, excluding East Germany pre-1997. Regressions control for individual fixed effects and year
indicators, fulltime status, and age, age2 and age3 interacted with education dummies.
57
Table 1.4: The Effects of Outsourcing on Establishment Wage Premia
All OS Food Cleaning Security Logistics
Panel A: OLS
Working for Business -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.11*** -0.26*** -0.11***
Service Firm (0.00020) (0.00095) (0.00028) (0.00059) (0.00028)
Observations 33744965 1205601 10057326 3014162 19467876
OS Workers 1462892 41534 624617 172323 651270
Non-OS Workers 4327576 245946 1262057 390783 2563769
Mean depvar for OS workers 1.82 1.78 1.79 1.69 1.88
Panel B: Individual Fixed Effects
Working for Business -0.10*** -0.090*** -0.075*** -0.20*** -0.083***
Service Firm (0.00035) (0.0021) (0.00068) (0.0020) (0.00044)
Observations 33744965 1205601 10057326 3014162 19467876
OS Workers 1462892 41534 624617 172323 651270
Non-OS Workers 4327576 245946 1262057 390783 2563769
Mean depvar for OS workers 1.82 1.78 1.79 1.69 1.88
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the worker
level. Food regressions include only workers in food occupations, such as cooks, waiters and food
preparers. The variable “Working for Business Service Firm” takes a value of one if the worker
is employed in an industry that provides food services to other firms or a temp agency. Samples
and variables are defined analogously for cleaning and security regressions, respectively. In all
regressions, sample is restricted to workers age 25-55 at establishment with at least 50 employees.
Workers in East Germany before 1997 are excluded. In food services regressions, workers at
restaurants and cafes and hotels are excluded.Controls for year dummies; fulltime status age age-
squared and age-cubed interacted with education dummies. Panel B also controls for individual
fixed effects.
Table 1.5: Change in AKM Effect by Outsourcing Type
and Outsourcing Establishment AKM Effect
Mother AKM
Quartile Food Cleaning Security Logistics
1 -0.10 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02
2 -0.08 -0.16 -0.10 -0.07
3 -0.12 -0.18 -0.06 -0.10
4 -0.24 -0.26 -0.16 -0.14
Notes: Change in AKM Effect of outsourced worker fol-
lowing on-site outsourcing. Sample divided into quartiles of
AKM effect of outsourcing (mother) establishment.
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Table 1.6: Determinants of Outsourcing
All Establishments Establishment Panel Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log Estab Size 0.008***
(0.0002)
Log Avg Estab Wage 0.0004
(0.0003)
AKM Effect 0.005***
(0.0006)
Wage Premium 0.002***
to FSCL (0.0003)
Collective 0.009***
Agreement (0.001)
High Salaries 0.0005
a Burden (0.001)
Pay Wages 0.003**
Above Standard (0.001)
Observations 2086507 2086505 1892408 1769077 68577 65577 68595
Mean of Dep Var .012 .012 .011 .014 .02 .02 .02
Mean of Indep Var 4.788 4.285 1.95 1.162 .81 .42 .34
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the establishment level.
All regressions exclude East Germany before 1997 and establishments with less than 50 workers. Columns
5-7 includes only establishments included in the IAB Establishment Panel Survey. All regressions control
for state dummies, year dummies, and industry dummies. Dependent variable = 1 if the establishment was
involved in either a general outsourcing event or an on-site outsourcing event in the following year, and 0
otherwise. “Collective Agreement”=1 if the establishment responded that they were bound by a collective
agreement. “High Salaries a Burden” = 1 if the establishment responded that one of its expected problems
with human resources management in the next two years was the high financial burden on wage costs. “Pay
Wages Above Standard”=1 if the establishment responded that they pay salaries and wages above the col-
lectively agreed scale. “Wage Premium to FCSL” is the ratio of the average wage paid to Food, Security,
Cleaning and Logistics workers at the establishment to the average wage paid to Food, Security, Cleaning
and Logistics workers employed by business services firms or temp agencies in the same county and year.
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Figure A.1: Characteristics of Outsourcing Establishments, before and after out-
sourcing
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Notes: Graphs show average characteristics of outsourcing establishments, in each year
before and after outsourcing. The first graph shows the number of workers in occupations
of outsourcing type; for example, for a firm that outsources to a foodservices firm, the
dependent variable would be the number of workers in food occupations, such as waiter
and cook.
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Figure A.2: Outsourced Workers by Year
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Notes: Own Calculations, using method tracking flows of workers as described in the text.
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Figure A.3: Outsourcing by Year
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Notes: Own Calculations, using method tracking flows of workers as described in the text.
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Figure A.4: Workers in FCSL Occupations By Year
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who are employed by restaurants and hotels.
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Figure A.5: Regression Estimates of the Effects of being Outsourced on Workers
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(c) Days Worked Per Year
Notes: The figures show regression estimates of the effects of being outsourced on wages,
earnings and days worked before and after the outsourcing event, using the matched sample
of outsourced and non-outsourced workers. All regressions include individual fixed effect
and year dummies. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The wage regression
uses the full universe of workers, while the earnings and days regressions use a 25pct
sample (to be updated using the full universe of workers soon).
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Figure A.6: Employment Outcomes of Outsourced and Non-Outsourced Workers
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Notes: The figures follow two group of workers who in year t=-1 are employed at an
establishment that outsources part of its workforce in year t=0. The first group are all
the outsourced workers, while the second group is a control group of workers who are
working in the same industry and occupation with similar tenure and establishment size in
the year prior to outsourcing, and have similar wages 2 and 3 years prior to outsourcing
as the outsourced workers. The figures on the left show average characteristics of the
workers in the two groups before and after the outsourcing event, while the figures on the
right show regression-adjusted estimates, controlling for individual fixed effects and year
dummy variables. These figures were created using a 25pct sample of the universe of data
(to be updated using the full universe of workers soon).
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Figure A.7: Effect of Working at a Business Services Firm on Log Wages
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Coefficients from regressions of log wages on outsourced status controlling for individual fixed effects and year dummies.
Separate regressions run for each 5−year period
Outsourced at BSF or Temp firm. Workers age 25−55; excludes East Germany before 1997.
Food workers at restaurants and hotels are excluded.
Industry−Occupation Outsourcing Regression Coefficients by 5−year Intervals
Notes: Each point is the estimated coefficient from a separate regression of log wages on
an indicator variable which equals one if the worker is employed at a business services
firm and zero otherwise. All regressions include individual fixed effects and year dummy
variables. Before 1999, industry codes did not differentiate between restaurants and food
business services industries, such as canteens and catering. Excludes food workers em-
ployed in the restaurant and hotel industries.
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Figure A.8: Frequency of Occupational Layoff Outsourcing Events by Year
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Figure A.9: Regression Estimates of the Effects of being Outsourced on Employ-
ment Outcomes, using Occupational Layoff Outsourcing
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Notes: The figures show regression estimates of the effects of being outsourced on wages
and employment before and after the outsourcing event, using the matched sample of out-
sourced and non-outsourced workers and the occupational layoff definition of outsourcing,
described in the text. All regressions include individual fixed effect and year dummies.
Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure A.10: The Frequency of the term “Outsourcing” on Google Books Analysis
Site Ngram over Time
(a) Search hits for the term “outsourcing” on Google Ngram
Notes: The figures shows how often the term “outsourcing” appears in all books in the
Google Books database by year. Accessed October 16, 2014.
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Table A.1: Outsourcing Establishment Characteristics by Daughter Type
Food Cleaning Security Logistics
# of Employees 590.24 617.24 1,065.38 1,119.74
(1,829.58) (1,127.55) (2,383.76) (2,943.80)
Avg Wage in Euro 64.92 70.86 79.55 84.89
(17.91) (18.69) (23.81) (19.35)
AKM Effect 1.39 1.41 1.53 1.52
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Avg Yrs of Education 10.49 10.56 10.48 10.47
(0.90) (0.97) (1.26) (0.90)
Share College 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07
Share Female 0.69 0.62 0.36 0.32
Share West Germany 0.88 0.77 0.71 0.95
Firm Age in Yrs 15.09 13.92 13.24 13.74
(9.05) (10.45) (7.44) (9.23)
Share Food Workers 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.05)
Share Cleaning Workers 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.01
(0.08) (0.22) (0.09) (0.02)
Share Security Workers 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.00
(0.02) (0.06) (0.19) (0.01)
Share Logistics Workers 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.13
(0.04) (0.09) (0.18) (0.17)
Industry Shares
Agriculture 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mining, Energy 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
Investment, Production 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.29
Consumption Goods 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.20
Construction 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.05
Retail 0.49 0.01 0.03 0.30
Traffic, Telecom 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.06
Health 0.13 0.25 0.04 0.01
Services 0.24 0.46 0.41 0.07
Other 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.01
Observations 502 280 138 1224
Notes: Mean of each variable with standard deviation in parentheses. Data in-
cludes all outsourcing mother establishments. Excludes East Germany prior to
1997. Statistics calculated in year before outsourcing. For firms that outsource
multiple times, the first outsourcing incident is used.
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Table A.2: Food, Cleaning, Security and Logistics Occupation Codes
Occupation Type Occupation code Label
food 911 Restaurant, inn, bar keepers, hotel proprietors,
catering trade dealers
food 912 Waiters, stewards
food 913 Others attending on guests
food 411 Cooks
food 412 Ready-to-serve meals, fruit,
vegetable preservers, preparers
cleaning 923 Other housekeeping attendants
cleaning 933 Household cleaners
cleaning 934 Glass, buildings cleaners
cleaning 936 Vehicle cleaners, servicers
cleaning 937 Machinery, container cleaners
and related occupations
security 791 Factory guards, detectives
security 792 Watchmen, custodians
security 793 Doormen, caretakers
logistics 714 Motor vehicle drivers
logistics 741 Warehouse managers, warehousemen
logistics 742 Transportation equipment drivers
logistics 743 Stowers, furniture packers
logistics 744 Stores, transport workers
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Table A.3: Daughter Establishment Industry Codes
Type Valid Years Industry Code Label
food 1975-1998 703 Restaurants
food 1999-2009 55301 Restaurants with service
food 1999-2009 55302 Self-service restaurants
food 1999-2009 55303 Cafes
food 1999-2009 55305 Snack bars
food 1999-2009 55404 Refreshment stalls
food 1999-2009 55510 Canteens
food 1999-2009 55520 Catering
cleaning 1975-1998 721 Industrial cleaning
cleaning 1999-2009 74701 Cleaning of buildings,
rooms and equipment
cleaning 1999-2009 74703 Cleaning of means of transport
security 1975-1998 861 Security and storage activities;
courier services
security 1999-2009 74602 Security activities
Logistics 1975-1998 651 Carriage of goods by motor vehicles
Logistics 1975-1998 670 Forwarding agencies,
storage and refrigeration
Logistics 1999-2002 60241 Short-distance freight transport by road
Logistics 1999-2002 60242 Long-distance freight transport by road
Logistics 1999-2002 60244 Freight transport by road, other
Logistics 2003-2009 60245 Commercial freight haulage
Logistics 2003-2009 60246 Road haulage
Logistics 2003-2009 63110 Cargo handling
Logistics 1999-2009 63121 Storage and warehousing
Logistics 1999-2009 63122 Refrigerated warehouses
Logistics 1999-2009 63211 Car parks and garages
Logistics 1999-2009 63401 Freight forwarding
Logistics 1999-2009 63402 Group consignments by sea
Logistics 1999-2002 63403 Other transport agencies
Logistics 2003-2009 63404 Other logistics services
Temp 1975-1998 865 Labour recruitment and
provision of personnel
Temp 1999-2002 74501 Labour recruitment
Temp 1999-2002 74502 Provision of personnel
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Table A.4: Business Service Firm Industry Codes
Type Valid Years Industry Code Label
food 1999-2009 55510 Canteens
food 1999-2009 55520 Catering
cleaning 1975-1998 721 Industrial cleaning
cleaning 1999-2009 74701 Cleaning of buildings,
rooms and equipment
cleaning 1999-2009 74703 Cleaning of means of transport
security 1975-1998 861 Security and storage activities;
courier services
security 1999-2009 74602 Security activities
Logistics 1975-1998 651 Carriage of goods by motor vehicles
Logistics 1975-1998 670 Forwarding agencies,
storage and refrigeration
Logistics 1999-2002 60241 Short-distance freight transport by road
Logistics 1999-2002 60242 Long-distance freight transport by road
Logistics 1999-2002 60244 Freight transport by road, other
Logistics 2003-2009 60245 Commercial freight haulage
Logistics 2003-2009 60246 Road haulage
Logistics 2003-2009 63110 Cargo handling
Logistics 1999-2009 63121 Storage and warehousing
Logistics 1999-2009 63122 Refrigerated warehouses
Logistics 1999-2009 63211 Car parks and garages
Logistics 1999-2009 63401 Freight forwarding
Logistics 1999-2009 63402 Group consignments by sea
Logistics 1999-2002 63403 Other transport agencies
Logistics 2003-2009 63404 Other logistics services
Temp 1975-1998 865 Labour recruitment and
provision of personnel
Temp 1999-2002 74501 Labour recruitment
Temp 1999-2002 74502 Provision of personnel
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Chapter 2
Family Structure and Abortion Law
Family structure in the US has changed dramatically over the past few decades. Rates of single
motherhood have been increasing steadily since the 1970s. Over 40% of births now occur outside
of marriage, up from 10.7% in 1970, and for women under the age of 30 more than half of all
births are now to unmarried women (Wildsmith et al., 2011). The Pew Research Center reported
that in 2008, 16% of Americans lived in multi-generational homes, up from 12% in 1980. In trying
to understand these changes, researchers have tended to focus on three potential explanations for
the increase in single motherhood in the US: economic opportunities, marriage markets, and public
assistance benefits. However, empirical work has been inconclusive (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004).
The current study proposes a fourth potential contributor to recent changes in family structure:
state abortion laws. Prior to the 1970s, abortion was illegal in the United States. While a few
states legalized the procedure in the early 1970s, the 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade
made abortion legal across the country. States were given some rights to regulate abortion, and
since the early 1990s have increasingly enacted laws restricting access. The resulting changes in
abortion access could affect family structure through various channels. For example, they could lead
to positive or negative selection of pregnancies and births, or change the bargaining power within
relationships. While these channels have been explored with regard to the “shock” of abortion
legalization in the 1970s in Gruber et al. (1999) and Akerlof et al. (1996), here the focus is on the
opposite direction - the effect of limiting access to abortion.
The populations affected by the changes in abortion access studied in this chapter are likely to
differ from those impacted by abortion legalization in the 1970s. Before Roe v. Wade was decided,
only women residing in the five states that had legalized abortion early, and those wealthy enough to
travel from other states, had the option of a legal abortion in the case of an unwanted pregnancy. For
many women, obtaining a safe abortion was virtually impossible. The decision in Roe represented
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a huge increase in the availability of safe, regulated abortions for the majority of women across
the US at that time. In contrast, the laws enacted in the 1990s and 2000s have typically made the
procedure more expensive and difficult to obtain, although it remains legal. These laws increase the
cost of obtaining an abortion directly, by limiting Medicaid funding for poor women or restricting
insurance coverage, or indirectly through mandated waiting periods which may entail increased
time away from work, forgone wages and travel costs. Unlike the Roe decision, these laws may
not affect all or most women equally. Instead, they are likely to have a disproportionate impact
on poor women, for whom the additional out-of-pocket costs, travel time, and lost wages may be
insurmountable.
In order to analyze the association between recent abortion regulations and family structure, data
on the status of several state abortion laws from 1990-2010 were collected. Complete information
is available for three types of regulations: Medicaid funding restrictions, mandated waiting periods,
and insurance coverage restrictions. After confirming that these laws have a first-order effect on
abortion and fertility rates, I turn to child-level data from the 2000 Census 5% sample and the 2001-
2010 American Community Surveys. Each child is connected to the abortion laws enforced in his
state of birth at the time he was in utero, as well as his current family structure. The average impact
of abortion laws on family structure is negligible for the overall population. However, when this
effect is allowed to vary for different subgroups, I find evidence that abortion laws matter more for
certain populations of children than others. In particular, low-income children exposed to stricter
abortion laws are more likely to live with an unmarried mother or in a three-generation household
and less likely to live with married parents than low income children born under more permissive
abortion regimes. Because low-income status itself may be affected by abortion laws and family
size, I also look at the impact on children of mothers with low educational attainment.
A potential issue is the endogeneity of the abortion laws themselves. Abortion restrictions may
be passed to reflect the preferences of the citizens of the state; if these same preferences are reflected
in other policies or in people’s behavior that affects their living circumstances, then changes in
family structure may be mistakenly attributed to the enacted abortion restrictions. This threat is
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first addressed by including a variety of controls to account for state preferences, time shocks, and
time-varying changes in state characteristics and policies. Next, I use the strategy implemented
in Klick and Stratmann (2007) and Sabia and Rees (2013) and take advantage of the variation in
the enforcement status of abortion laws. This allows for the differentiation between the effect of
laws that have been passed and are being enforced, and those that were enacted but later enjoined
by a court order. The analysis shows that, for low-income children and children of low-education
mothers, enforced abortion laws are associated with changes in family structure while nullified
laws have no effect. This finding supports the idea that for these groups, behavior is impacted by
the hurdles presented by the laws themselves and not other unobserved factors associated with the
passage of the abortion laws.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Background information on the history and current status
of abortion law in the US is provided in Section 2.1, followed by a discussion of the way these
laws could impact women and children in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 outlines the data and results for
pregnancy outcomes and family structure, while Section 2.4 addresses the potential endogeneity of
the abortion laws. Other factors are considered in Section 2.5, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 Background
Until the late 1960s, abortion was prohibited in all states, although some provided exceptions in
order to save the life of the mother. Starting in 1970, several states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New
York and Washington) loosened their restrictions, making abortion more broadly available to women
there. In 1973, the US Supreme Court decided the landmark case Roe v. Wade, which recognized
the right to privacy of a woman choosing whether to abort a fetus or to carry the pregnancy to term,
but gave the states some ability to regulate the procedure. This was implemented in a trimester
framework: in the first trimester, women were free to choose to have an abortion; in the second
trimester, states could impose some limits but could not ban abortions outright; in the third, the
states were allowed to ban abortions completely except in cases where the life or health of the
woman was jeopardized.
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Following Roe, states began to enact laws limiting the availability of abortion in later parts of
pregnancy, and slowly their ability to legislate abortion was defined. The Hyde Amendment, en-
acted by Congress in 1976, prevented federal funds from being used to pay for most abortions;
states were allowed to impose similar restrictions on Medicaid funding. For a few years, only
parental consent/notification laws for minors seeking abortions were upheld, while other restric-
tions were challenged in the courts and struck down. Later Supreme Court decisions, in particular
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey (1992), greatly expanded the ability of the states to regulate abortions. The Casey
case specifically ratified Pennsylvania’s 24-hour mandatory waiting period, parental notification for
minors, and requirement that specific information about health risks be provided to all abortion pa-
tients. More generally, the decision abandoned the trimester structure defined in Roe and instead set
a new standard for states, allowing restrictions prior to viability of the fetus so long as they did not
impose an “undue burden”’ on women (Hull and Hoffer, 2010).
After the Casey decision, an increasing number of state abortion regulations were enacted. Some
of the most common restrictions put in place over the past 20 years include:
Medicaid funding: Some states allow Medicaid to cover abortion costs only in cases where the
woman’s life is in danger or when the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. Others have chosen
to allow for other specific circumstances, or to fund all or most medically necessary abortions for
Medicaid-enrolled women.
Insurance coverage: Some states prohibit all private insurance policies from covering abortion ex-
cept in cases of life endangerment, although a few allow policyholders to purchase abortion coverage
through a supplemental rider at an additional cost. Other states refuse to include abortion coverage
in policies that cover public employees or are paid for in part with state funds.
Mandatory counseling/informed consent: Many states require that specific information be provided
to a woman before an abortion, but the mandated information varies widely from state to state. In
some, women have to be informed of the risks of both the procedure and of continuing the preg-
nancy, while other states provide information specifically intended to dissuade the woman from
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having the abortion. This could include detailed information and photographs describing fetal de-
velopment, mandated ultrasounds, or discussion of the (disproved) links between abortion and in-
fertility, breast cancer and depression.
Waiting period: Several states require a waiting period between a mandatory counseling session and
the abortion procedure, often necessitating two separate trips to the clinic.
Parental involvement: Most states require parental consent or notification prior to a minor’s abor-
tion, although some allow another adult relative to stand in for a parent. States are required to
provide a judicial bypass procedure whereby the minor can obtain a court order stating that waiving
parental involvement is in her best interest.
Gestational limits: Some states prohibit abortion after a specific point in the pregnancy, such as the
24th week or the start of the third trimester, while others restrict abortion after viability.
Figure 2.1 shows the numbers of states with each of the restrictions described above, in every
year from 1990 to 2010. For each type of law, the solid line indicates the number of states with
the regulation on the books, while the dashed line shows the number of states actually enforcing
the law.1 Overall there is an upward trend in the number of states enacting and enforcing each type
of law, with the exception of Medicaid funding restrictions. Although over time more states have
chosen to enact this type of regulation, there have been several court rulings that ordered states to
fund abortions for Medicaid recipients if they provide funding for other pregnancy and childbirth-
related services.2
Also of interest is how the restrictiveness of states has evolved over time. In Figure 2.2, states
are colored according to their change in the number of abortion restrictions enforced between 1993
and 2010. States colored a darker shade of grey have had the largest increase in the number of laws,
adding up to four restrictions, while striped states have become more permissive (thicker black
stripes indicate fewer restrictions enforced). A large number of states, particularly in the south and
1Abortion restrictions are often challenged in the courts. Depending on the outcome of the case, judges may choose to
temporarily or permanently enjoin laws, prohibiting them from being enforced during the designated time period. In this
chapter, laws considered to be “enforced” are those which have been enacted and have not been struck down or enjoined.
2As of January 2011, four states and Washington DC voluntarily chose to fund abortions through Medicaid, while
thirteen fund abortions for poor women because of a court order.
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central US, have become more restrictive in the past two decades, while a few states have become
more lenient regarding the abortion regulations considered.
2.2 Theoretical Framework and Literature
As the number of abortion restrictions in a state increases, so too does the cost of obtaining an
abortion. Some of the restrictions directly raise the financial cost of an abortion, while others
increase costs indirectly. For example, Medicaid funding restrictions force already poor women to
take on the added expense of the abortion, despite the fact that many other pregnancy-related costs
are typically covered by Medicaid. Limits on health insurance coverage require women to pay out of
pocket, although they may have coverage for other medical procedures. Mandated waiting periods
can add to the burden indirectly by increasing the amount of time a woman needs to set aside for
the procedure, potentially resulting in lost wages and higher travel costs if she needs to travel a
long distance to her provider and miss additional days of work. Parental involvement laws increase
the psychological cost for teens seeking an abortion (Sabia and Rees, 2013), and could add to the
financial cost if the minor travels to another state in order to obtain an abortion without her parents’
consent. Policies such as mandated counseling also add to the psychological toll without adding
directly to the financial expense. The resulting cost increases are likely to be more burdensome
for poor women than for those who can more easily absorb the additional expenses or circumvent
stringent rules in their own states by traveling to more permissive states.
There are several channels through which abortion costs could impact family structure and other
outcomes for women and children. The focus of this chapter is on the mechanism of selection.
Changes in abortion regulations could affect who becomes pregnant and which pregnancies are
carried to term, thus altering the distribution of children who are born under different abortion policy
regimes.3 The direction of the effect of selection in this circumstance is theoretically ambiguous.
3Another mechanism is presented by Akerlof et al. (1996), who formulate a model in which the increased availability
of abortion and contraception in the 1970s decreased women’s bargaining power in demanding marriage in the case
of a premarital pregnancy. These changes in reproductive technology and relationship dynamics lead to increases in
sexual activity but decreases in “shotgun marriages,” resulting in more out-of-wedlock births. In a recent working paper,
Beauchamp (2012) tests this theory in a more contemporary setting, looking at the effect of laws removing public funding
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An increase in the cost of abortion directly affects the options available to some pregnant women: of
the women who would have chosen an abortion, the poorest may be no longer able to pay the large,
up-front cost required for the procedure and will be forced to carry the pregnancy to term.4 This
would result in a decreased number of abortions and increased number of births, and in particular
births of children into more disadvantaged circumstances - a negative selection effect. In contrast,
before becoming pregnant, women may look ahead and take into account the cost of an abortion. If
they did become pregnant, the most disadvantaged women would not be able to afford an abortion
if they wanted one, and so they may choose to increase their use of contraceptives or reduce sexual
activity to avoid becoming pregnant in the first place. On this margin, the number of pregnancies
would go down. The avoided pregnancies may have otherwise ended in either birth or abortion, and
so the number of births and abortions would either decrease or stay the same. Any births avoided
under this margin would have been to children in more challenging circumstances, resulting in a
positive (non-negative) selection effect.5 Empirical work is required to determine which of these
effects is dominant.
Much of the previous work relating children or adult outcomes to the legal status of abortion
has appealed to selection as the driving mechanism. Gruber et al. (1999) found evidence of positive
selection into improved living circumstances following the legalization of abortion in the 1970s,
with children born after abortion was legalized in their home state less likely to live in single-parent
households or in poverty. Other papers analyzed the relationship between abortion legalization and
crime (Donohue and Levitt, 2001),6 teen childbearing (Donohue et al., 2009), college graduation
and rates of welfare receipt (Ananat et al., 2009); they generally found that cohorts born under
greater abortion availability had improved outcomes relative to those cohorts born under more re-
strictive abortion policies.7
of abortion on the probability of a woman remaining in a relationship with her child’s father.
4The price of a typical abortion varies depending on location and how far along the pregnancy is, but median price is
approximately $460 for a first-trimester abortion and $1260 for a second-trimester abortion (Phillips et al., 2010), not a
trivial amount.
5A complete model leading to these insights can be found in Ananat et al. (2009).
6This result has been disputed, see Foote and Goetz (2008) and Joyce (2009)
7Studies outside of the US have reached similar conclusions; for example, Pop-Eleches (2006) found that, after
controlling for background characteristics, schooling and labor market outcomes declined for children born following an
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Given the different populations affected by abortion legalization and the more recent abortion
laws, it is not clear whether the same forces will be operative in the current situation. While most
research on post-legalization abortion regulation has examined the first-order effects on abortions
and births,8 little work has been done on other outcomes. Currie et al. (1996) used NLSY data from
1980 to 1989 to examine the effect of Medicaid funding restrictions on birth weights, but found no
effect of the law. Bitler and Zavodny (2002) used both the legalization of abortion in the 1970s and
a few post-legalization state restrictions and found some evidence that legalization was associated
with lower rates of reported child abuse/maltreatment, but no consistent effect of restrictions put in
place in the post-Casey era; they were somewhat constrained by their data, which in later years did
not allow them to distinguish each child’s state and year of birth. Borelli and Kaestner (2012) looked
at women from 2000-2009 who were differentially exposed to parental involvement laws as teens.
They found that women who faced stricter laws were more likely to have higher fertility and lower
human capital investments, with strongest effects for black women. The current work contributes to
this literature by analyzing another important outcome: children’s living circumstances. It considers
the impact of a full set of state abortion laws rather than analyzing one law at a time, and, by using
a very large, nationally representative data set, has the power to identify the effects of the laws on
relevant subsamples of the population.
2.3 Analysis
2.3.1 Abortion Law Data
To collect the data for 17 years of abortion laws across the 50 states and Washington DC, a variety
of sources were consulted. The most comprehensive was the series “Who Decides? The Status
of Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United States,” which has been published every year since
1989 by the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL). These books list
abortion-related laws by state as of the beginning of the year, along with information on whether
abortion ban in Romania.
8For example, see Blank et al. (1996), Coles et al. (2010), Colman and Joyce (2011) and New (2011).
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the laws were challenged in court and the results of the legal action.9 Another source of information
was the Guttmacher Institute, a non-profit organization that studies sexual and reproductive health
and policy. Since 2001, the Guttmacher Institute has published a series of “State Policies in Brief”
factsheets.10 Each factsheet describes a different regulation related to abortion, contraception or
sexual health, and lists which states have the law on the books and its enforcement status.11
The final analysis focuses on three common types of abortion restrictions from 1993 to 2010:
insurance restrictions, Medicaid funding restrictions and waiting periods.12 Each law is encoded as
a binary variable, taking a value of one if the law was enforced in the state as of the start of the year,
and zero otherwise.13 An additional variable notes whether the law was on the books but had been
nullified as a result of a court case.
2.3.2 Pregnancy Outcomes
The first order effect of abortion restrictions should be on the number of births and abortions that
occur. This section verifies whether changes in abortion restrictions are associated with changes
in pregnancy outcomes, giving us an indication of whether we should expect to see evidence of
positive or negative selection in the outcomes considered later.
Fertility rate (births per 1000 women age 15-44) data comes from the U.S. National Vital Statis-
tics Reports, which provide aggregate data for the complete universe of births at the state-year level.
9I was able to obtain copies of “Who Decides” for the years 1991-1993, and 1995-2003. More recent editions of
“Who Decides” are much less detailed and less useful for the purposes of this research.
10The most recent versions can be found at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/index.html
11For years in which there was incomplete or uncertain information regarding the status of a law, a variety of supple-
mentary sources were consulted, including state government websites and court case reviews and documents.
12Although data on parental involvement, mandated counseling and gestational limit laws were collected as well, these
laws were not included in the analysis. Counseling laws were omitted because of the enormous variation that exists
in their implementation across states, gestational limits were excluded because of the limited variation in the enact-
ment/enforcement of these types of laws in the time period under study, and parental involvement laws were excluded
because they only affect a small subset of women, those under the age of consent.
13For the Medicaid funding restriction, a state-year was coded with a 1 if the state did not allow for Medicaid funding
of abortions except in specific cases such as in instances of rape or incest, or if the mother’s life was in danger; a value
of zero was coded if public funding for abortion was broadly available to women on Medicaid. States with restrictions
on either the private insurance coverage of abortion or on the coverage for public employees were coded as a 1 for
the insurance law. For the waiting period requirement, states that required a waiting period of 18 hours or more (thus
necessitating two visits to the doctor/clinic) were coded with a 1; those with a shorter waiting period (1-2 hours) or no
required wait were coded with a zero.
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State-year abortion rates (abortions per 1000 women age 15-44) were obtained from the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Abortion Surveillance System. The CDC collects data on
abortion counts every year, relying on state health departments to voluntarily provide the informa-
tion. With no standardized data collection procedure or consistent reporting requirements across
states or years, the CDC data is incomplete and may be subject to under-reporting.14 As such, the
results in this section are helpful in determining the direction of the effect of abortion restrictions
on abortion rates, but exact point estimates should be regarded with caution.15
The first specification takes the form:
Yst = β0 +β1Insurancest +β2WaitingPeriodst +β3PublicFundingst +β4Xst +δs + γt + εst (2.1)
where Yst is the outcome variable (fertility rate or abortion rate) for state s at time t. The three
abortion restrictions are included as the explanatory variables of interest. Each law variable takes
on a value of 1 if the law was enforced at the start of the year in each state, and zero otherwise. Laws
that were enacted but nullified by the courts are excluded here in order to give a better measure of
the hurdles actually faced by women seeking an abortion (nullified laws will be used later in the
analysis). Xst is a vector of time-varying state characteristics that could affect abortion and fertility
patterns in the state. For example, women may be more likely to seek abortions in times of financial
hardship; state unemployment rates and the change in unemployment, average hourly wages for
males and females, and a measure of state welfare generosity account for this. The Guttmacher
Institute reports that the majority of women seeking abortions are unmarried, and that a large share
are poor or black (Jones et al., 2010); for this reason, variables capturing the percent of individuals
living in poverty and the share of adult women who are married or are black are included in the
14Please see the appendix for more details on the CDC abortion data as well as other data sources.
15The Guttmacher Institute also collects their own data on abortion rates, conducting periodic surveys of all known
abortion providers. The GI admits to difficulties in identifying small providers who may not want to be identified as
performing abortions; they also must make informed estimates as to the number of abortions for some larger providers
that decline to respond to their survey (Jones and Kooistra, 2011). I use the CDC data in the analysis because, unlike the
Guttmacher data, it is available every year and also by some subgroups. Guttmacher and CDC abortion rates are highly
correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.93, and results using Guttmatcher abortion rates are quite similar to those
using the CDC data.
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regressions. Because many abortion providers are located in urban areas, the share of the resident
population living in urban areas is controlled for. To capture the impact of other state policies that
may have taken effect at the same time and that could have affected fertility patterns and abortion
rates, I control for the Republican share of the state legislature.16 Year dummy variables control for
time-specific shocks that may affect all states in a given year, while state dummies are included to
account for unobserved state preferences that are fixed over time.
Table 2.1 shows the results from these regressions; column 1 uses the abortion rate as the de-
pendent variable, while column 4 uses the abortion rate. The coefficients on all three abortion laws
in the abortion rate regressions have a negative sign, although they are all insignificantly different
from zero. In the fertility rate regressions, all three laws are associated with higher fertility rates,
although only the coefficients on the insurance restriction and waiting period laws are significantly
different from zero.
One potential issue with this approach is that each law, in isolation, may not have a very large
effect on fertility outcomes. While the higher cost from any one of these restrictions may not be
insurmountable, it could be that the accumulation of multiple restrictions results in hardships which
some women seeking an abortion can not overcome. In order to check this, I sum the number of
restrictions enforced in each state-year, and regress the abortion rate on this number in columns 2
and 5 of Table 2.1. The number of abortion laws enforced in a state is associated with a higher
fertility rate and lower abortion rate, although the coefficient is again insignificant for the abortion
rate regression. However, these regressions only provided average effects for the whole population,
when in fact different segments of the population are likely to be impacted differentially. As dis-
cussed earlier, low-income women may be one such population, but unfortunately information on
births or abortions by income at the state level are not available. Black women have higher rates
of unintended pregnancies, unintended births, and abortions than white women (Finer and Hen-
shaw, 2006) and therefore are another demographic group that could be more affected by increased
abortion regulations.
16Republican and Democrat legislators are likely to propose and support different types of legislation related to abortion
and contraception, and children and family policies (Saint-Germain, 1989).
84
Births by race are obtained from the US Statistical Abstract. The CDC Abortion Surveillance
Reports provide data on the number of abortions by race and state, which are combined with census
estimates of state populations of women age 15-44 by race to determine the state-year-race abortion
rate. The point estimates here should again be taken with caution - if the CDC abortion rates as a
whole are subject to under-reporting and measurement error, then the data disaggregated by race is
likely to be even more so. In addition, there are even more missing observations and inconsistencies
in the reporting. As such, these results should be interpreted as providing supportive evidence on
the direction of the effect of abortion laws on different groups, not the exact size of the effect. In
this part of the analysis the sample is limited to abortions and births to white and black women for
consistency across years.
In columns 3 and 6 of Table 2.1, the effect of the number of abortion restrictions is allowed to
vary for black and white pregnancy outcomes. In column 3, we see that black women do indeed
have higher abortion rates; however, the interaction term Laws×Black is negative and significant,
indicating that abortion rates for black women are lower in states that have a higher number of
abortion laws, relative to the abortion rate for black women in more permissive states. Meanwhile,
in the fertility rate regressions the coefficient on the interaction term Laws×Black is positive and
significant, evidence that births to black women increase when there are a greater number of abortion
restrictions in place. Overall, the results depicted in Table 2.1 lend support to the idea that an
increased number of state abortion restrictions is associated with lower abortion rates and higher
fertility rates, particularly for black women, consistent with a stronger effect of negative selection.
2.3.3 Family Structure
The preceding section provided evidence that abortion laws matter for birth outcomes, and that a
greater number of abortion restrictions is associated with fewer abortions and more births. Now we
turn to the main focus of this chapter: the effect of abortion restrictions on family structure. Because
the results on pregnancy outcomes were consistent with a dominant effect of negative selection, we
would correspondingly expect to see children born under more restrictive abortion regimes to be
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living in more challenging circumstances.
2.3.3.1 Data
In order to obtain a large nationally representative sample, data from the 2000 Census 5% sample
was combined with the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2001-2010 to form a repeated
cross-sectional data set. Similar to Bitler et al. (2006), the unit of analysis is the child, rather
than the woman (as is more common in the literature on single motherhood or effects of abortion
law). Focusing on children allows for the inclusion of those living in less common arrangements,
such as with their father or grandparents, with no mother present. It also allows me to correctly
identify in time the abortion regulations under consideration - those that were in effect while the
child was in utero, when the mother would have been deciding whether to carry the pregnancy to
term or not. In addition, since much of the concern regarding different types of living situations is
about the consequences for children, it seems most natural to look to the children themselves and
the family structures they experience. The sample is restricted to children age five and under to
reduce the probability that the living situation may have changed since the child’s birth, for example
from parents divorcing, the mother remarrying, or the family moving in or out of a home with
grandparents (results don’t change substantively other samples are considered, such as children up
to age three or seven). Because of the age restrictions and the sample years used, the abortion
regulations under analysis are from the years 1994-2009.
The survey data links each person in the household to their parent, if a parent is present; these
variables, along with marital status, are used to determine the family structure of every child in
the sample. Indicator variables are constructed for whether a child is living with a married parent,
whether or not he is living with a single (unmarried) mother, and if he is living in a three-generation
household (i.e. with a parent and grandparent).17 These three family types cover most of the sample
- 92% of children live in one of these types of households.18 These types of living situations have
17In this construction, there may be overlap between the three-generation household category and the other household
types - for example, a child could be living with married parents and his grandparents, and would be counted under both
indicators.
18Of the remaining children, 54% live with their father (no mother or grandparents) and 46% live with neither parent.
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also been the subject of the most academic and media attention. Much of the research on the
effect of living circumstances compares the impact of living with both parents to living with one
parent, while the media has focused on the rise in single motherhood in the US and the increase
in three-generation households as adult children moved back in with their parents during the recent
recession. Since these are the most prevalent and most discussed types of households, it is relevant
to consider the factors encouraging their creation.
Table 2.2 depicts summary statistics for the children in the sample. Overall, black children
are more likely to live in low income homes (low income is defined as a household with income
below 150% of the poverty line) and with mothers with less than a high school education than white
children. They are also much less likely to live with married parents, more likely to live with single
mothers and slightly more likely to live in three-generation households. Children living in low-
income homes are more likely to have mothers with low educational attainment and are more likely
to live with a single mother than the general population.
2.3.3.2 Effect of Abortion Laws - Full Sample
The first equation estimated is:
Hist = β0 +β1Insurancebu +β2WaitingPeriodbu +β3PublicFundingbu
+β4Xit +β5Ybu +β6Zst +δs + γt +δs× t + εist (2.2)
Hist is an indicator variable for one of the three family structure variables for child i, in survey
year t, currently living in state s, who was in utero in year u and born in state b.19 The abortion
regulation variables give the enforcement status of each law in the child’s state of birth in the year
he was in utero.20
Several sets of controls are included in the regressions. First are demographic controls for the
19approximately 11% of children in the sample no longer live in the state in which they were born.
20Two different methods are used to determine the year in utero- please see the Appendix for details.
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child - age, race, and indicators for whether he lives in an urban or rural environment. The next
set of controls include characteristics of his birth state from the time he was in utero, which could
have influenced his mother’s decision of whether to become pregnant or to carry the pregnancy to
term. These include the same economic variables that were used in the abortion and fertility rate
regressions: male and female unemployment rates, male and female average hourly wage rates, and
a measure of welfare generosity of the state, as well as the share of Republicans in the state legis-
lature to control for other state policies that could influence the mother’s decision. A third set of
controls include the same state characteristics but for the child’s current state of residence in the sur-
vey year, to account for factors that could affect the child’s current living situation.21 Indicators for
the survey year control for factors common to all states that could affect children’s living situations
in a particular year, while state-of-residence dummies account for state-specific unobservables. A
state-specific linear time trend controls for state trends over time in family structure. All regressions
are weighted using the person weights provided in the surveys, and standard errors are clustered at
the current state level.
Results for the full sample of children can be found in the first three columns of the top panel
of Table 2.3. The dependent variable for each regression is given by a dummy variable for the
household structure listed in the top row of the table. The individual abortion laws enforced in the
state of birth during the time in utero appear to have little effect on the child’s family structure. When
the individual laws are replaced by the number of enforced laws (bottom panel), the coefficient has
a value of zero.
2.3.3.3 Effect of Abortion Laws - Low Income Children
The previous analysis does not take into account the fact that many children are not impacted in any
way by the abortion laws in their state. Many mothers have no desire for an abortion, and so the
laws do not affect them all. Others are wealthy enough that the restrictions, and the extra costs they
incur, do not influence their decision. In the top panel of Table 2.4, the analysis is repeated but the
21Sources of all control variables are provided in the Appendix. Results are robust to the inclusion of other state
economic characteristics, such as GDP, GDP growth, and a measure of EITC credit.
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number of enforced abortion restrictions is interacted with an indicator variable which takes a value
of one if the child lives in a low-income home, and zero otherwise. For these children, the laws
take on a much bigger role. Low income children who are exposed to a higher number of abortion
restrictions while in utero are significantly less likely to live with married parents and more likely
to live with an unmarried mother or in a three generation household, as compared to low-income
children in less restrictive states. Specifically, a poor child born in a very restrictive state, with
three abortion laws enforced, is 5.7 percentage points less likely to live with married parents than a
similar child whose mother faces a more permissive abortion environment while pregnant.
There is some uncertainty regarding the classification of low-income status in this analysis.
Given the available data, it is impossible to know whether a child’s household would have been
classified as low income before he was born, or if it was pushed into low-income status after his
birth. This could happen mechanically: if household income stayed the same but family size in-
creased, the household could fall below the poverty threshold since the poverty line depends on the
number of household members. An extra child could also induce his mother to change her work pat-
terns (i.e. reducing her hours and thus decreasing her pay), and this reduction in income could lead
to a change in poverty status. Given this ambiguity, next the analysis focuses on another subgroup
which is correlated with low-income status, but not plagued with the same issue.
A proxy for low-income status of a child’s household is his parents’ education. Here I consider
the effect of abortion restrictions on children whose mothers have less than a high school education,
restricting my sample to children living with their mothers. Results are shown in the middle panel
of Table 2.4, with patterns similar to those for low-income children. However, looking at the edu-
cation of the mother introduces a potential source of endogeneity: the birth of a child to a young
mother could have interrupted her education and forced her to drop out of high school. In addition,
the effect could be driven by teen mothers who are still in high school, and thus more likely to be
unmarried and still living with their parents. To correct for this, the sample is restricted to children
whose mother was at least 20 years old at the time of the child’s birth (results shown in the bottom
panel of Table 2.4). For this subsample, the mother’s decision regarding high school completion
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should not have been affected by the birth of the child. Again, the patterns seen for low-income
children persist. Children born to low-education mothers in high-abortion-restriction states are sig-
nificantly less likely to live with married parents, and more likely to live with unmarried mothers
and in three-generation households. The effect of the laws is slightly smaller when the younger
mothers are excluded, indicating that teen mothers may indeed be impacted more strongly but are
not the only women affected. In terms of magnitude, each additional abortion law is associated with
an approximately 2.4 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of living with married parents and
similar increase in the likelihood of living with an unmarried mother. This amounts to a 7.2 percent-
age point difference between similar children born to low-education mothers in the most-restrictive
(three laws) and least-restrictive (zero laws) abortion environments, all else equal.
2.4 Endogeneity of Abortion Laws
The endogeneity of the laws themselves poses a potential threat to the previous results. If state
abortion laws are passed to reflect the preferences of the people in the state, and these same pref-
erences influence their decisions regarding fertility and family structure, then the coefficient on the
law variable will be biased. Although the prior analysis attempted to address this issue by includ-
ing state fixed effects, year fixed effect, state specific time trends, and a variety of time-varying
state characteristics and policy variables as controls, here I follow the strategy outlined in Klick
and Stratmann (2007) and Sabia and Rees (2013) and include information on enjoined or nullified
abortion laws. Abortion laws are often challenged in the courts, which may result in a judge issuing
an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of a particular law.22 While the passage of the law may
reflect the preferences of the citizens of the state, the decision of a judge is less likely to do so.
The regressions shown in Table 2.5 include a variable giving the number of abortion restrictions
that have been passed but nullified in the child’s state of birth. If family structure is influenced
by norms, preferences, other policies, or anything else that is reflected in the passage of abortion
regulations, then the coefficient on the nullified laws will be significant and of the same sign as
22In some cases, the state attorney general publicly decides that the law is not to be enforced.
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the coefficient on the enforced laws. On the other hand, if it is the enforcement of the restrictions
and the hurdles they impose on women seeking abortions that influence family structure, then the
coefficient on the nullified laws will be close to zero.
The first column of the top panel shows that the number of enforced abortion restrictions has a
negative and significant effect on the likelihood that a low-income child lives with married parents,
even after controlling for the number of nullified restrictions in the state. When the effect of the
nullified laws is allowed to differ for low-income and higher-income children (column 2), the main
result is unchanged - the number of enforced abortion laws is associated with fewer low-income
children living with married parents, while the number of nullified laws has no effect. Across all
three types of family structures considered, the coefficients on the Nullified Laws variable and the
interaction term Nullified Laws × Low Income are small in magnitude and insignificantly different
from zero, while the number of enforced laws continues to have a significant effect on the family
structure of low-income children. In the second panel, the analysis is repeated for children with
mothers who have less than a high-school education (restricted to mothers who are age 20 or over at
the time of their child’s birth). The results here follow the same pattern as for low-income children.
The nullified laws have no effect on the family structures of children of low-education mothers,
while the enforced laws have a consistently significant effect (except in the case of 3-generation
households, where the coefficient shrinks and loses significance). These results provide further
evidence that it is the restrictions faced by these women seeking abortions, and not changes in
unobserved norms, preferences or other state policies, that affect the living circumstances of their
children.
2.5 Other Factors
2.5.1 Neighboring States
Another factor to consider in evaluating the effect of abortion policies in one state is the ease of
abortion access in neighboring states. If the laws in their home state are particularly restrictive,
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women may prefer to travel to a nearby state in order to obtain an abortion. For example, following
the passage of stringent abortion provider requirements that led to the closing of many late-term
abortion clinics in Texas, Colman and Joyce (2011) find that the number of abortions obtained
out-of-state by Texan women almost quadrupled. However, travel may not be an option for lower-
income women, since this would likely take time and money, which they may not have. To see if
abortion policies in neighboring states affect children’s living situations, the analysis in Table 2.6
includes a measure of the average number of abortion restrictions enforced in all states sharing a
border with the state of birth, weighted by the inverse distance from the capital of the state of birth to
the capital of the neighboring state.23 Controlling for the policies of neighboring states has almost
no impact on the effect of regulations in the state of birth, and the coefficients on neighboring state
laws are small and insignificant. Interacting the number of enforced laws in neighboring states with
an indicator for low-income status also has little impact on the effect of state laws, and the coefficient
on the interaction itself is small and insignificant. The only exception is for 3-generation households.
Neighboring state laws are associated with an increased likelihood of living with grandparents for
low income children, similar to the laws in the child’s on state. Results are the same whether we
consider low income children or children of low-education mothers.
2.5.2 Birth Order
Another potential source of variation comes from the birth order of the child. On the one hand,
having a child entails a huge financial cost: buying a crib, stroller, baby clothes, and all of the other
necessities for a new baby. These costs are typically lower for higher birth-order children, who can
use the supplies and hand-me-downs of their older siblings. Timing the first birth optimally may
be more important, particularly for poor women, to make sure that they have the money needed for
these initial costs; increasing the cost of abortion makes it more difficult for poor women to time
their births, making it harder to avoid adverse circumstances for their children. On the other hand, a
recent study found that 61% of women having abortions already had at least one child (Jones et al.,
23Results change very little if the average is weighted by state population, or if an unweighted average is used.
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2010), so changes in abortion restrictions may be most pertinent for women who already have at
least one child at the time of their pregnancy.
Using information on other children in the household, each child is classified as either an
only/eldest child who has no younger siblings living in his household, or as a younger sibling.24
Table 2.7 shows the results when the previous regressions are re-run for each type of child sepa-
rately, including all of the controls described earlier. Looking first at the top panel, the number of
abortion restrictions in a state tends to have a similar impact on the living circumstances of both
firstborn and higher birth order children in low-income homes. Meanwhile, for children of low-
education mothers (bottom panel), abortion laws have more of an impact for the family structure of
first-born children.
2.6 Conclusion
While abortion remains legal in the United States, in the past 20 years states have enacted an in-
creasing number of regulations to limit the ability of women to obtain the procedure. Many of these
laws effectively increase the costs faced by women seeking an abortion, and are thus likely to have
a disproportionate impact on the poor. This chapter examines the living situations of children born
under different levels of abortion regulation. The results suggest that while the laws have very little
influence on kids overall, children of low-income mothers who are exposed to restrictive abortion
environments are more likely to be living in single-parent homes and less likely to live with married
parents than children born under more liberal abortion regimes. They are also more likely to be
living in multi-generational homes than others in their cohort who were born in states with easier
abortion access. Examination of other groups that are likely to be correlated with low-income status
leads to the same conclusions.
One limitation of this study is that it can only capture each child’s living situation at one particu-
lar moment in time. Other studies have found that the living circumstances experienced by children
24There is no information on children who are no longer living in the household, so some children may be mis-
categorized as eldest/only children when in fact they have older siblings who live elsewhere.
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change over the course of their lifetime - parents marry, divorce, or form new partnerships, while
other relatives may move in or out (Blau and Klaauw, 2008). Because the structure of the data is a
repeated cross-section, I can only identify the family structure of a child at a snapshot in time, the
year of the survey. However, since abortions are a fairly rare occurrence - in 2008, the abortion rate
in the US was 19.6 abortions per 1000 women - and the current abortion laws are likely to affect
only certain populations of women, in order to be able to identify an effect for particular subgroups
a very large sample is needed, which the Census/ACS provides (and most longitudinal data sets do
not).
A large longitudinal data set would also be useful in identifying the long-term effects of differ-
ent types of family structures. Previous studies have found associations between living with a single
parent (particularly a single mother) and decreased educational attainment, as well as increased
likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors such as drug use, smoking and sex.25 There is less of a
consensus on the impact of growing up in a multi-generational household, with researchers finding
conflicting results (Deleire and Kralil (2002) find improved outcomes for children living with a sin-
gle mother and grandparents, while, using different data, Hill et al. (2001) find that children in the
same type of household had worse outcomes). Identifying the causal effects of alternative family
structures rather than simply documenting correlations between household type and outcomes is a
continuing challenge. The results of the current research could serve as a first stage in determining
a causal link between family structure and children’s outcomes. If the changes in family structure
induced by variations in abortion law lead to worse outcomes for children, and this primarily af-
fects children of poor mothers, then these abortion regulations could be associated with long-term,
persistent inequality. As states consider further restrictions to abortion access, it is important for
policymakers to understand the full impact of these laws on the lives of the women and children
affected.
25See Painter and Levine (2000), Antecol and Bedard (2007), and Bjorklund et al. (2012).
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2.7 Empirical Appendix
2.7.1 Timing of Laws
Ideally, I would know the exact month and year of birth for each child, which would allow me to
connect him to the law information from exactly when he was in utero. Unfortunately, the Census
and ACS do not provide exact date of birth, only age as of the last birthday; there is also no infor-
mation on the survey date. To address this, I calculate the year in utero in two ways. First, I use a
“naive” approach - I assume that if a child is age a in year t, then he was born in year t-a, and so was
in utero in the previous year, t-a-1. For example, for a child who is 2 years old in the 2001 survey,
I would assume he was born in 1999 and in utero in 1998, and so I would assign to him the laws
enforced in his state of birth in 1998. This may not precisely capture the experiences of all children,
depending on when during the year they were born and how far from the child’s birthday the inter-
view takes place. As an example, consider a child who was listed as 1 year old in the 2001 ACS.
At one extreme, the child may have been born on Jan 2, 1999, and the interview took place on Jan
1, 2001, with the child one day away from his 2nd birthday. Since he was born in January 1999, he
was in utero in 1998, and so we should consider the abortion laws enforced in 1998 (interview year-
age-2). At the opposite extreme, his birthday could be on Dec 30, 2000 and the interview date on
Dec 31, 2001 - he just turned 1 year old at the time of the interview. In this case, the child was in
utero during 2000, and laws from 2000 should be considered (interview year-age). In general, any
of the years between (interview year-age-2) and (interview year-age) may be the relevant year to
look at, and unfortunately I have no way of identifying exactly which year I should use. As another
specification, I take the average number of laws across the three possible years during which the
child could have been in utero, and use that as my main independent variable. All results shown use
the “naive” approach, but my results remain substantively unchanged if I use the 3-year average.
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2.7.2 Data sources and details
Abortion Rates - CDC: The CDC reports abortion rates for all states and years from 1993 to 2008
with the following exceptions (years with missing data in parentheses): AK (1998-2002), CA (1998-
2008), LA (2005-2006), MD (2007-2008); NH (1998-2008), OK (1998-1999), DC (1993-1996),
WV (2003-2004), WY (2000-2004, 2007-2008).
The CDC reports abortion rates by state and race, with the following missing observations:
AK (missing 1993-2002), AZ (missing 1999-2007), CA (1993-2008), CO (1993-1996), CT (1993-
2008), DE (1993-1996), FL (1993-2008), HI (2007-2008), IL (1993-2008), IA (1993-1997), LA
(2005-2006), ME (2003), MD (2007-2008), MA (1993-1999, 2008), MI (1993-2002), NE (1993-
2008), NV (1998-2008), NH (1993-2008), NM (2003-2008), OH (1993), OK (1993-1999), RI
(2002-2003, 2007-2008), SD (2002-2004), TX (2008), UT (2003-2008), WA (1993-2010), WV
(2003-2004), WI (2007-2008), WY (1993-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2008). The CDC data reports
abortion counts in 4 race categories - white, black, other and unknown - although in some years
the “other” and “unknown” categories are combined. I include only abortions to black and white
women, since in some states and years the abortion rates that I calculated for the “other” category
were implausibly high. There is an additional inconsistency in the reporting of abortions for New
York. In some years, the number of abortions is reported for New York state as a whole, some years
report the numbers for New York City and for New York state excluding NYC, while in other years
only abortions in NYC are reported. I calculate the average ratio of NYC to NY total abortions for
years when both numbers are provided; when only NYC abortions are reported, I apply this ratio to
approximate the number of abortions in NY state as a whole.
Fertility Rates: The U.S. National Center for Health Statistics National Vital Statistics Reports
contain data on birth rates for every state and year from 1993 to 2009, excluding 1996. The National
Vital Statistics Reports also contain data on births by race, although race is not consistently defined
or reported across years. In some years, the number of births was reported for all whites and white
non-Hispanic, as well as all blacks and black non-Hispanic; in other years only white non-Hispanic
and black non-Hispanic births were reported, or only all whites and all blacks. I calculated the
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average ratio of all white births to white non-Hispanic births. When only white non-Hispanic births
were reported, I applied this ratio to approximate the number of white births overall (I did the same
for blacks and non-Hispanic blacks).
Unemployment rate and hourly wage by state-gender: Calculated from CPS data each year
Race breakdown and share of state residents living in poverty by state: US Census Bureau each
year
Percentage of women who are married and percentage living in urban area: US Census Bureau,
1990 and 2000 (used 1990 value for 1990-1999; used 2000 value for 2000-2010)
Welfare generosity: Total AFDC/Food Stamp welfare benefits in 2000 constant dollars, 1990-
2009, Work Family data from Waldfogel, Han, and Ruhm (available at data.nber.org/data/).
Share of Republicans in state legislature: http://www.indstate.edu/polisci/klarnerpolitics.htm
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Figure 2.1: Number of States with Abortion Restrictions 1990-2010
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Figure 2.2: Change in Number of Laws Enforced 1993-2010
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Table 2.1: Abortion and Fertility Rates and Abortion Laws
Abortion Rate Fertility Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Insurance Restriction -0.17 1.31***
(2.23) (0.34)
Waiting Period -1.07 0.93***
(1.53) (0.31)
Public Funding -0.72 0.53
Restriction (2.66) (0.67)
Number of Laws -0.77 -0.15 0.94*** -1.63**
(1.06) (0.72) (0.23) (0.81)
Black 21.3*** 7.63***
(0.92) (0.77)
Laws*Black -1.29** 2.21***
(0.53) (0.44)
N 1104 1104 1104 816 816 1581
Mean of Dep Var 20.29 20.29 65.39 65.39
Mean DepVar (White) 10.47 63.03
Mean DepVar (Black) 30.15 73.83
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. Abor-
tion (fertility) rate = abortions (births) per 1000 women age 15-44. Abortion rate source is the CDC;
fertility rate source is the US Statistical Abstract. Controls include male and female hourly wage, male
and female unemployment rate, welfare generosity, % living in poverty, % urban, % black, state legislature
republican share, and number of abortion providers per capita. All regressions include state fixed effects
and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Children
All White Black Low Income
Age 2.50 2.53 2.53 2.45
(1.70) (1.70) (1.69) (1.69)
White 0.56 1.00 0.00 0.37
(0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48)
Black 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.23
(0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42)
Other race 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.40
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49)
Metro Area 0.84 0.78 0.89 0.80
(0.37) (0.41) (0.31) (0.40)
Mom Educ < HS 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.29
(0.34) (0.24) (0.36) (0.45)
Low Income 0.33 0.22 0.55 1.00
(0.47) (0.41) (0.50) (0.00)
Living Situation
Married Parents 0.68 0.78 0.33 0.42
(0.47) (0.41) (0.47) (0.49)
Unmarried Mom 0.22 0.14 0.52 0.44
(0.42) (0.35) (0.50) (0.50)
3-Gen HH 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.08
(0.29) (0.25) (0.34) (0.28)
Observations 2732967 1684559 317195 822982
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Mean of each variable with standard
deviation in parentheses. Data includes kids age 5 and under from the Cenus
2000 5% sample and ACS 2001-2010. Low Income refers to households
with income under 150% of the poverty line.
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Table 2.3: Household Structure and Abortion Laws - Overall
Married Unmarried 3-Generation
Parents Mom HH
(1) (2) (3)
Panel 1
Insurance Restriction 0.006 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Waiting Period -0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Public Funding Restriction -0.001 0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Panel 2
Number Of -0.000 0.000 0.000
Enforced Laws (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2307672 2307672 2307672
Mean of DepVar .678 .224 .096
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clus-
tered at the state level. Data includes children age 5 and under from 2000 Cen-
sus 5% and ACS 2001-2010. Regression are weighted using ACS weights. All
regressions include state economic controls (male and female average hourly
wages, male and female unemployment rates, welfare generosity) and Repub-
lican share of state government in the child’s state of birth at time of preg-
nancy and in current state and year, and child characteristics (age, race, and
urban/rural status) as described in the text. All regressions additionally control
for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a state-specific trend.
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Table 2.4: Household Structure and Abortion Laws - Low Income and Low
Education
Married Unmarried 3-Generation
Parents Mom HH
(1) (2) (3)
Panel 1 - Full sample
Enforced Laws 0.005 -0.006* -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Low Income -0.314*** 0.264*** -0.043***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.006)
Enforced Laws*Low Income -0.019** 0.020** 0.007**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.003)
Observations 2307672 2307672 2307672
Mean of DepVar- Low Income .449 .405 .089
Panel 2 - Full sample
Enforced Laws 0.003 -0.003 -0.003***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Mom<HS -0.128*** 0.128*** 0.038***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.013)
Enforced Laws*Mom<HS -0.031* 0.031* 0.023***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.006)
Observations 2084040 2084040 2084040
Mean of DepVar- Mom<HS .619 .381 .172
Panel 3 - Sample restricted to children with mother age≥ 20 at birth
Enforced Laws 0.001 -0.001 -0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Mom<HS -0.090*** 0.090*** -0.003
(0.023) (0.023) (0.008)
Enforced Laws*Mom<HS -0.024* 0.024* 0.013***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004)
Observations 1944045 1944045 1944045
Mean of DepVar- Mom<HS .688 .312 .11
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered
at the state level. Data includes children age 5 and under from 2000 Census 5%
and ACS 2001-2010. Regression are weighted using ACS weights. All regressions
include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, trend, and controls as described in table
2.3 .
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Table 2.5: Enforced and Nullified Abortion Laws
Married Parents Unmarried Mom 3-Generation HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1 - Full sample
Enforced Laws 0.005 0.005 -0.004* -0.004* 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Low Income -0.311*** -0.310*** 0.262*** 0.263*** -0.036*** -0.037***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004)
(Enforced Laws) * -0.013** -0.013** 0.011** 0.011* 0.003* 0.003*
(Low Income) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Nullified Laws 0.006 0.007 -0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
(Nullified Laws) * -0.002 -0.002 0.002
(Low Income) (0.016) (0.015) (0.003)
Observations 2307672 2307672 2307672 2307672 2307672 2307672
Panel 2 - Sample restricted to children with mother age≥ 20 at birth
Enforced Laws 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Mom<HS -0.095*** -0.095*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.018** 0.019**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.009) (0.007)
(Enforced Laws) * -0.018* -0.018* 0.018* 0.018* 0.006 0.005
(Mom<HS) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
Nullified Laws 0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
(Nullified Laws) * -0.000 0.000 -0.002
(Mom<HS) (0.023) (0.023) (0.007)
Observations 1944045 1944045 1944045 1944045 1944045 1944045
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. Data
includes children age 5 and under from 2000 Census 5% and ACS 2001-2010. Regression are weighted
using ACS weights. All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, trend, and controls as
described in table 2.3
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Table 2.6: Neighboring State Laws
Married Parents Unmarried Mom 3-Generation HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1 - Full sample
Enforced Laws 0.006* 0.006* -0.006** -0.006** -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Low Income -0.314*** -0.309*** 0.264*** 0.260*** -0.042*** -0.050***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.016) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007)
(Enforced Laws) * -0.019** -0.018** 0.020** 0.019** 0.007** 0.005*
(Low Income) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Neighbor Laws 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
(Neighbor Laws) * -0.006 0.004 0.008***
(Low Income) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002)
Observations 2287743 2287743 2287743 2287743 2287743 2287743
Panel 2 - Sample restricted to children with mother age≥ 20 at birth
Enforced Laws 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002** -0.002*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Mom<HS -0.090*** -0.085** 0.090*** 0.085** -0.003 -0.012
(0.023) (0.032) (0.023) (0.032) (0.008) (0.009)
(Enforced Laws) * -0.024* -0.023* 0.024* 0.023* 0.013*** 0.011***
(Mom<HS) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003)
Neighbor Laws -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
(Neighbor Laws) * -0.005 0.005 0.009***
(Mom<HS) (0.015) (0.015) (0.003)
Observations 1927694 1927694 1927694 1927694 1927694 1927694
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. Data
includes children age 5 and under from 2000 Census 5% and ACS 2001-2010. Regression are weighted
using ACS weights. All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, trend, and controls as
described in table 2.3
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Table 2.7: Birth Order
Married Parents Unmarried Mom 3-Generation HH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eldest
Child
Younger
Siblings
Eldest
Child
Younger
Siblings
Eldest
Child
Younger
Siblings
Panel 1 - Full sample
Enforced Laws 0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Low Income -0.333*** -0.300*** 0.314*** 0.285*** -0.036*** -0.023***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.006) (0.004)
(Enforced Laws) * -0.016** -0.013** 0.011 0.010* 0.003 0.003*
(Low Income) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 921551 1299571 921551 1299571 921551 1299571
Panel 3 - Sample restricted to children with mother age≥ 20 at birth
Enforced Laws -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Mom<HS -0.097*** -0.100*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.037*** 0.017**
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.012) (0.007)
(Enforced Laws) * -0.025* -0.016 0.025* 0.016 0.010 0.004
(Mom<HS) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003)
Observations 731198 1212847 731198 1212847 731198 1212847
Notes: (*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01) Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. Data includes
children age 5 and under from 2000 Census 5% and ACS 2001-2010. Regression are weighted using ACS weights. All
regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, trend, and controls as described in table 2.3
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Chapter 3
Identifying Couples in Administrative Data: Methodology and Application (with
Wolfram Klosterhuber and Johannes Schmieder)
3.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a dramatic rise in the use of administrative data in economic research,
facilitated by increases in computing power and the availability of new administrative data sources.
The main advantages of administrative data have been large sample sizes compared to survey data,
often covering the entire universe; the ability to follow the units of observation over time; and
the high quality of recorded information. This shift has been particularly forceful in Labor and
Public Economics, where the availability of individual level employment and tax records has led
to the rise in new research designs such as regression discontinuity, regression kink or bunching
designs that rely on very large sample sizes. While administrative data offer many advantages, they
also come with limitations and the scope of available variables is often quite limited compared to
household surveys. In particular administrative employment records are typically on the individual
level only and it is often not possible to link individuals to other household members. For this
reason administrative data have played a much smaller role in studying traditional questions in
labor economics, such as household labor supply, household investment decisions in human capital
or within household income differences.
In this project we develop a new method to impute household identifiers in the administrative
employment records data in Germany to increase the scope of research questions that can be ad-
dressed. Our approach is to identify pairs of individuals who are, with a high probability, married
couples using information on addresses, family names and dates of birth. In Germany it is still very
common that at the time of marriage one spouse (in the vast majority of cases the wife) adopts the
other spouse’s last name, either fully or as part of a double name. If two individuals with matching
last names are living together at the same address, they are likely related, though they could also be
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in a sibling or parent-child relationship. To further narrow it down to married couples we take pairs
of a woman and a man with matching last names with an age difference of less than 15 years, which
should exclude most parent-child relationships. We present a detailed analysis of the likely extent
of errors when applying this method.
Germany has a long tradition of women taking on their husbands’ last name at the time of
marriage. The German Civil Code from 1896 unequivocally required that the wife takes on the
name of her husband. A reform in 1953 allowed for the wife to keep her birth name as part of
a double (or hyphenated) last name, but she was still required to take on her husband’s name as
the family name. The family name law was revised again in 1970 allowing that a couple could
decide to take on the wife’s name as the family name, but kept the requirement of a common family
name for both spouses. Furthermore if a couple could not come to an agreement with respect to
which name would become the family name the decision was up to the husband. This only changed
with a decision by the German constitutional court in 1991 and a subsequent revision of the family
name law in 1994, after which both spouses were allowed to keep their own birth names, while the
traditional option of taking on one of the birth names or a hyphenated double name for one of the
spouses continued to exist. In practice it appears that it is still the case that the vast majority of
women take on their husband’s names either fully or at least as part of a double name. While we
are not aware of representative surveys or official registry data for Germany that would allow us to
calculate the share of couples with matching last names, we found various press reports from city
level wedding registries that seem to suggest that even among newly wedded couples around 85 to
90 percent still have a matching last names. Among couples married for longer (and in particular
before 1994), the ratio is likely significantly higher.
We implement the method of identifying likely couples using last names, addresses and age
using a cross-section of the administrative data from the Institute of Employment Research (IAB)
in Germany spanning the universe of employment and unemployment records for 2008. This data
covers all individuals who are employed in employment subject to social security contributions,
receive benefits from the unemployment insurance (UI) system, or who are registered as job seekers.
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This data covers around 80 percent of employees, in particular excluding public servants and the
self-employed. By design we are only able to identify married couples where both spouses are
covered in the IAB data. While this is certainly not a representative sample and excludes a sizable
part of the population of couples we are still able to identify over 3 million couples who are likely
married to each other. The two main concerns with this approach are the potential for false positives
and false negatives. False positives may arise because people with matching last names may live at
the same address either purely by chance, or because they are related to each other but not married.
Using the distribution of same-sex matching name pairs, as well as information on family status for a
subset of individuals we show that likely around 88 - 94 percent of our sample of couples are indeed
married to each other. Even if both spouses of a married couple are in our data, false negatives
may arise, because we may not match them to each other. Either they do not have matching names
or there are more than 2 matching individuals at a location, making it impossible to tell who is
married to whom. False negatives will also arise whenever one or both members of a marriage are
not covered in the IAB data, which for example would include all self-employed, public servants
or individuals not in the labor force, but also all individuals older than age 65. Using information
from the Microcensus, we show that we can identify roughly 20 percent of the 18 million married
couples in Germany. Furthermore given that many couples in Germany are older than 65, a group
of individuals who are not covered in our administrative data, we capture around 30 percent of the
couples where the husband is younger than 65. We also compare the observable characteristics of
our matched couples with the official census data to show how our sample differs from the general
population of married couples.
This chapter is related to other research that uses the special features of administrative data
to impute information that is not directly available. For example Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan
(1993) use the combination of individual and firm identifiers in UI records from Pennsylvania to
impute plant closings and mass layoffs by observing when large numbers of individuals are mov-
ing away from firm identifiers and are scattered across many other employers. Hethey-Maier and
Schmieder (2013) use a similar approach to identify new plant openings in administrative data,
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relying on worker flow information to distinguish plant openings from spurious changes in firm
identifiers. Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2014) identify outsourcing of labor services in large firms
employing an algorithm based on a combination of worker flows, industry and occupation codes.
The next section describes the data used in this project. Section 3.3 describes our method
for identifying couples and presents the results based on individuals in 2008. In section 3.4 we
show supportive evidence that our method does in fact largely identify married couples and develop
bounds on the fraction of false positives. We then present characteristics of the couples that we
identify with our method and compare them to the general population in the German employment
data, as well as to other data sources. In section 3.5, we use the identified couples to explore the
issue of relative income within the household. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data Sources
In this section, the sources of the data are explained in detail. Subsection 3.2.1 describes the In-
tegrated Employment Biographies (IEB) data, while the geocoded location data and the individual
name data are discussed in 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Integrated Employment Biographies
The Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the Institute for Employment Research (Institut fr
Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung - IAB) stem from the notification process of the social security
system of the Federal Employment Agency (BA). The IEB consolidate completed, historicized and
edited process data from different data sources, which come from different operative systems. It
comprises all persons registered with the Federal Employment Agency due to the following:
1. Employment subject to social security or marginal part-time employment
2. Receipt of unemployment insurance benefits in accordance with Social Code Book II or III
3. Job search registered with local employment agencies
4. Planned or actual participation in an employment or training programs
The IEB includes demographic variables such as nationality, birthdate, gender, education and family
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status. Information on employment, benefit receipt and job search include daily wage, daily benefit
rate, occupational and employment status or economic activity. Additionally location data such as
place of residence or work on different aggregated levels are provided. There are at least 40 million
working individuals in Germany, about 80 percent of whom have at least one record in the IEB.
The biggest groups which are not included in the biographies are self-employed workers and public
servants called Beamte.
3.2.2 Geocoded Data
Our method relies on finding individuals living at the same location. In principle individuals can be
matched to other individuals at the same location either by directly comparing addresses, or by first
geocoding addresses into latitude / longitude coordinates and then comparing coordinates. Matching
addresses directly is complicated by the fact that these can often be written in a variety of ways and
need to be carefully cleaned. We instead match individuals on geographic coordinates, where the
address processing was done using GIS software, which allows for careful error correction methods.
The geocoding was done in a project between the Research Data Centre (FDZ) and the University
of Duisburg-Essen for a cross-section of all individuals in the IEB data as of June 30th, 2008. This
project used data from the Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy, and includes 22 million
addresses of German buildings and their geographic coordinates and it was possible to successfully
geo-code 94.6 percent of the IEB records.
3.2.3 Names
One of the criteria that we use for determining couples is whether the last names of two people
match. We therefore also obtained data on last names covering the universe of individuals who
have a record in the IEB as of June 30th, 2008. In order to improve the probability of success in
matching, we first clean the names of errors and typos, and ensure consistency in terms of special
characters and titles. With the support of the German Record Linkage Centre (GermanRLC) and
their algorithm, the names of the individuals were cleaned, taking into account certain patterns and
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potential discrepancies. Umlauts were substituted (a¨ to ae and so forth) as well as ß to ss. All
blank spaces in the front, middle or end of the name were removed. Professional and nobility titles
(such as Dr., Prof., Freiherr von) were removed as well, and special characters (e.g. ˜ or %) and
non-ASCII characters (e.g. c© or TM) were deleted.
The only special character that was retained is the hyphen (-), which is used to indicate double
names. While the family name law in the civil code book states that a spouse can add their birth
name to the family name does not specifically mention a hyphen, in practice this appears to be the
only option. In fact a court decision from 2013 specifically ruled that a couple was not allowed
to combine the birth names of two spouses without a hyphen (Kammergericht Berlin 2013). Fur-
thermore individuals are not allowed to create last name chains that involve more than one hyphen
(for example if at the time of marriage an individual already has a double name from a previous
marriage). We thus assume that double names are always separated by a hyphen and we describe
below how we use hyphenated names in our name-matching algorithm. At the end of the cleaning
process all letters were converted to upper case.
Although individuals have a consistent personal identifier, the Einheitliche Statistische Person
(ESP), the last name may vary across different data sources. If, after the name cleaning process was
completed, discrepancies persisted in the names across data sources, the individual was dropped.
The exception was when an individual had a double last name in one source and an overlapping
single last name in another (e.g. MUELLER-MEIER in one source and MEIER in another). In this
case, the double last name was kept.
3.3 Identifying Couples
As mentioned previously, although the IEB data consists of a large amount of information on the
majority of the German population, it like many administrative data sets does not include any
information on the household. To circumvent this issue, we combine the IEB data with the geocoded
location data and information on names to infer probable married couples. We use the following
criteria to ensure that the matches we identify are most likely married couples and not simply two
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people with some other type of relationship (or no relationship at all):
1. Same home location
2. Uniquely matching last name
3. 1 male, 1 female, with an age difference of less than 15 years
We go into more detail on each of these requirements below.
3.3.1 Location
The first step in identifying potential married couples is finding people who live at the same location,
since most married couples live together. We start by looking at the distribution of the number of
individuals at a particular location, using each person’s geocoded coordinates, for the approximately
33 million people in our data. The second column of Table 3.1 shows this distribution. Coordinates
with a small number of individuals likely represent single-family homes, while coordinates where
a larger number of individuals live are likely apartment buildings or other multi-unit residences.
About 5 million individuals live alone at a coordinate we eliminate these people from our set of
potential couples, leaving us with about 28 million individuals. About 7.4 million individuals live at
a location with exactly 1 other person in the dataset; as the number of people living at a coordinate
gets larger, the absolute number of people living in this type of residence decreases.
3.3.2 Names
Next, we look at the cleaned names of the individuals living within any given location. We require
that our identified married couples share a last name. In situations where any of the people in the
location has a hyphenated name, we consider two names to be a match if at least one part of the
hyphenated name is identical to another name at the location. In locations with multiple people, we
additionally require that a maximum of two people have matching names. Otherwise, we have no
way to determine which two individuals are likely to be a couple and which may be unrelated, or
related in other ways. The following examples help to clarify the procedure.
In Table 3.2 A, there are 5 individuals living at a particular coordinate. Two have the last name
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COHLE, and there are no others names COHLE at this location, so they are kept as a potential
match. Two are named HART, with no others named HART, and so they are also kept as a potential
match. Finally, there is a single person named MEIER, who is dropped from our potential group of
couples. In Table 3.2 B, we again have 5 individuals living at the same coordinate: three have the
last name COHLE, one has the last name HART, and one has the last name HART-MEIER. Because
there are more than 2 individuals at this location with the last name COHLE, we can not be certain
which of these are part of a couple and which are not, so we drop all three. Because HART and
HART-MEIER share a partial name, even though one is hyphenated, they are kept as a potential
match. In Table 3.2 C, there are again 5 individuals at the same coordinate. Because COHLE,
COHLE and COHLE-MEIER all match in terms of their names, we must eliminate all three, since
we have no way of knowing which two could really be a couple. Similarly, MEIER, MEIER-
MUELLER and COHLE-MEIER must all be dropped, despite their names matching. Therefore, in
this example, there is no match chosen.
After running this algorithm over the 28 million individuals, we are left with about 5 million
pairs (ten million individuals) who share a location and last name. The third and fourth columns
of Table 3.1 show the number and percent of people that were matched through this algorithm,
organized by the number of individuals at a location. For coordinates with only 2 individuals,
almost 70% had matching names. At coordinates with 3 or more people found at the same location,
the match rate is between 20% and 30%.
There are several limitations to this criterion. First, while the majority of married couples in
Germany share a last name (or part of a double name), not all women (or men) change their last
name upon marriage, and we are certain to miss those couples. Second, in locations with multiple
people where more than two share a last name, since we can not be certain which two members
are married (if any) we must drop them all, eliminating more potential matches from our sample.
Finally, we may be capturing two people with the same last name living in the same coordinate
who are related but not married. In addition, particularly in multi-unit residences, there may be two
people who are unrelated but have the same last name, and we may erroneously be including them
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in our sample. Our next criteria, on gender and age, will eliminate some of these falsely matched
people from our sample, but not all.
3.3.3 Gender and Age
Finally, we take our set of potential couples groups of two people who share a last name and a loca-
tion and impose gender and age restrictions. Since we are currently only identifying heterosexual
couples, we require that each couple be composed of one male and one female, information that
is available in the IAB records. The second column of Table 3.3 presents the gender composition
breakdown for the 5 million identified potential couples. More than 4 million of these pairs consist
of one male and one female, while the remainder is made up of either two males or two females.
We drop the single-sex households and move on to the age difference requirement.
We first look at the distribution of age differences among matched pairs by gender composition.
Figure 3.1 graphs the distribution of the age difference between the two members of the couple,
defining the difference as the man’s age minus the woman’s age. The majority of the mass lies
between -15 and +15. This likely includes the majority of married couples, although it could also
include brother-sister pairs (or other closely-aged family members, such as cousins). It may also
include some unrelated people who simply live in the same location and have the same last name.
There is a smaller mass for pairs where the female is 20-40 years older than the male, which is
likely to include mothers living with their sons, and an even smaller mass for pairs where the male
is 20-40 years older than the female, which likely includes father-daughter pairs. These parent child
relationships may either be single parents or families where only one of the parents are working in
employment covered in the IEB. The fact that there seem to be more mother-son pairs than father-
daughter pairs is likely explained by the fact that there are more single mothers than single fathers.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the age difference distribution for matched pairs with the same gender,
where the age difference is defined as the older age minus the younger age. For both of these,
the majority or pairs fall between 15 and 40, which is likely to consist mainly of mother-daughter
or father-son pairs. There is also some mass for pairs with an age difference of 0-15 years; these
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may be siblings or other familial relationships, homosexual couples, or other pairs of people who
coincidentally have the same last name in the same location. While homosexual couples can form a
civil union in Germany since 2001 which allows them to adopt a common family name, these still
seem to be relatively rare, with only 34,000 same sex civil unions in 2011 (Statistisches Bundesamt
2012). Thus while a small part of the same sex matches might be same sex couples most of them
are not. The fact that the number of same sex matched individuals in our sample is quite small,
suggests that there are relatively few cases where people live together with the same last name for
other reasons than being married to each other and that in turn most matched individuals who are
living with each other in this age group are in fact married to each other.
For determining our sample of couples, we require that the difference in age of the matched
man and woman be less than 15 years. This should eliminate any mother-son or father-daughter
pairs from the set of couples. The remaining pairs consisting of one man and one woman, with
matching last names, who live in the same location and are less than 15 years apart in age make
up our final sample. Columns 4-5 of Table 3.3 show the results when we impose our age difference
restriction. We retain 80% of our male-female couples, leaving us with a final sample of about 3.3
million couples. This sample should be primarily composed of true couples, although some share
will be “false positives”, made up of male-female siblings or family members who are similar in
age, or unrelated people with the same name living at the same coordinates.
3.4 Consistency Checks
Errors in our matching algorithm could occur in two ways. First, we have false positives two people
who are matched to each other by our algorithm, but who are not really a married couple. Second,
there are couples that we do not pick up with our matching method, for various reasons. We discuss
these two issues, and the steps we take to quantify their magnitude, below.
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3.4.1 False Positives
One type of error that could occur is when our algorithm matches two people who are not really
married to each other, also known as type 1 error. Pairs in our sample may be wrongly matched if:
(1) they are brother and sister, or have some other family relationship, are close in age, and live in
the same location; or (2) they are unrelated, but living in a multi-unit residence, such as an apartment
building, and happen to have the same last name and are close in age.
We can try to measure the size of this type of error in our final sample of couples in a few
ways. First, we can use the distribution of same-sex matches to give us a sense of what share of
our sample are wrongly matched if we make the following two assumptions. The first assumption
is that opposite-sex family members who are close in age (i.e. brother and sister) are as likely to
live together as same-sex family members (two sisters, for example). The second is that it is as
likely for two people of the opposite sex who live in the same building to share a last name as it is
for two people of the same sex. Using these assumptions, we can look at the number of same-sex
matched pairs that fall within our age difference restriction (ages within 15 years of each other),
using the numbers provided in Table 3.3 these couples are likely either pairs of family members
living in the same location, or unrelated people with the same last name in the same building. We
find that there are 185,313 male/male and female/female pairs that fall within our age restriction.
So, it is likely that approximately 185,000 couples in our sample of matched male-female couples
with age difference under 15 years are also wrongly matched. In fact, since there are some same-sex
civil unions where partners share a family name, this arguably overestimates the number of false
positives by a small amount. Using this methodology, our accuracy rate is around 94% (final sample
is 3,281,657; estimated wrongly matched is 185,313; correctly matched = 3,281,657 - 185,313 =
3,096,344; accuracy rate = correctly matched / final sample = 3,096,344 / 3,281,657 = 94%). So,
according to this method, only about 6% of our sample is wrongly matched and our sample does
indeed identify couples who with a high degree of certainty are indeed married to each other.
Next, we use the “Family Status” variable to perform an additional check on the validity of
our sample. This variable is available as part of the Jobseeker History ((X)ASU) dataset, and thus
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is only filled in for a small subset of people those who are registered as job seekers as of June
30th, 2008. From our sample of approximately 10 million matched individuals, about 1.5 million
have the family status variable filled in. The variable takes on four possible values: living alone,
cohabiting, single parent, or married. Table 3.4 depicts the distribution of family status values
across all individuals with a matched name within their location. Although 85% are missing the
family status variable, of those in the data with a family status listed, approximately 64% are listed
as married, 22% are listed as living alone, while the rest are either cohabiting or are single parents.
We investigate further by looking at the combination of family status for matched pairs, shown
separately by gender composition and age difference (Table 3.5). When we look at male-female
pairs with an age difference under 15 years, we see that, for couples with at least one family status
listed, they are listed as either both married or one married-one missing family status 89% of the
time. This is far higher than for same-sex pairs with age difference under 15 years, who are listed
as both married or one married-one missing only 9% of the time. Male-female couples with an
age difference of 15 years or more are listed as both married or one married, one missing 25% of
the time. This could either indicate that there are some married couples with an age difference of
larger than 15 years, but could also be because these are indeed parent-child relationships where the
spouse is not covered in the data (or does not share a last name).
Using the information in Table 3.5, we can also estimate the share of matches in our final sample
that are likely to be true couples and not wrongly matched people (i.e. our “accuracy rate”) using
the subsample of couples with at least one family status listed. If we think that the family status
variable is accurate, then the set of true couples in our sample should be 578,088: the number
of couples who are listed of either being both married or one married, on missing family status.
Even within these there may be individuals who were mistakenly matched. For example, there
may be a job-seeking man with the last name MUELLER, whose wife is out of the workforce (and
hence is not included in the IEB data), living at the same coordinates as a similarly-aged jobseeker
woman with the last name MUELLER whose husband is not in the IEB data either. Our matching
algorithm would connect these two job-seekers, who are both listed as being married, even though
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they are not actually married to each other. If we think that it is as likely for two individuals of
the same gender to be wrongly matched in this way as it is for two opposite-gender individuals,
then we can use the information on family status for same-sex pairs for our accuracy estimate.
Specifically, there are 5,173 (637 + 4,536) same-sex matched pairs with age difference less than 15
years where family status is listed as both married or married-missing. Since we know that these
are wrongly matched pairs, we can assume that the same number of opposite-sex pairs was wrongly
matched as well. So, the estimated “true” number of couples in the subsample of couples with
family status is 572,915 (578,088 matched M-F with age difference less than 15 and family status
married-married or married-missing minus 5,173 same-sex pairs with age difference less than 15
and married-married or married-missing status). Since our full sample of matched couples (with
family status) is made up of 649,643 (3,281,657-2,632,014) couples, our estimated accuracy rate
is 88.2% (572,915 true couples / 649,643 total couples in our final sample of couples with family
status filled in for at least one of the members), or 11.8% error rate.
We may expect fewer errors of this type in our matching algorithm if we restrict our focus to
coordinates with exactly two people in this case, there are likely to be fewer mismatched pairs of
the type described above. When we repeat the accuracy rate estimation, restricting our sample to
matched couples living at coordinates where exactly 2 people live, we find that to be the case: our
estimated error rate is likely a bit lower, around 8.6% (table not shown).
While using the job-seeker data is helpful for estimating the likely fraction of false positives, it
should be kept in mind that neither is this subsample representative, nor necessarily is family status
measured without errors. It may well be the case that we are overestimating or underestimating the
number of false positives here. Overall, based on the two approaches discussed, we estimate that
the fraction of false positives lies somewhere in the range 6% to 11.8%.
3.4.2 Missing Couples
Given the data we are using and the matching algorithm we have developed, we are likely to have
missed many true married couples, either among individuals who are in our dataset (a form of type
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2 error) or where at least one spouse is not covered in the IEB. According to the Microcensus
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2012), there were 18,008,000 married couples in 2011; of those, about
8.8 million had 2 or more working individuals in the household. About 12.5 million of the couples
had a husband under 65 years old. In our final sample, we have 3.2 million couples. Therefore, we
capture about 18% of the total number of married couples, or 26% of those with a husband under
age 65.
There are several types of couples that we are likely to miss in creating our final sample. Any
couple where one or both members is not in the IEB would be omitted for example, if one member
is not in the labor force, or is a public servant or other type of worker not covered by the IEB. It
covers about 80% of the German workforce, which includes approximately 60% of the German
population age 15 and above, according to the World Bank.
If the couple does not share a last name (or part of a hyphenated name), then we would not
capture them with our algorithm. Until 1991 it was required by German law that married couples
share a last name, and even afterwards most change or hyphenate their last name upon marriage.
Although we were not able to find official statistics on this topic, according to several newspaper
articles the share of new couples who share a last name is around 85-90%. Couples where one or
both members are non-German are the least likely to share a last name.
Couples where the age difference between the husband and wife is more than 15 years are
omitted from our sample in an effort to ensure that we do not mistakenly include parent-child pairs in
our sample. Although there are certainly married couples with a 15-year or larger age difference, the
number of these types of couples is quite small. For example, in the micro census, a representative
survey of German households, the share of couples with a 16-year or more age difference was only
2% in 2011.
We also investigated the likely impact of our age restriction using the marital status variable
available in the job seeker data. For the subsample of couples where we have the marital status for at
least one of the two individuals, in Figure 3.4 we plotted the share of couples where either both were
reported as married or one person was married and the other person’s marital status was missing.
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Matched couples where both are married seem to be very rare when the woman is older than 15
years than the man. This suggests that there are almost no true couples that we are missing with the
15 years age difference restriction. On the other end there is still a high share of couples where the
man is around 15 to 20 years older than the woman where both are reported as married. If these are
true couples, then we are excluding them from our set of likely married couples. Notice however
that while the share is significant, Figure 3.1 shows that there are almost no couples in the 15 to 20
years age window (consistent with the information from the micro census), again suggesting that
the 15 years age difference restriction does not exclude many true couples. There are more matched
pairs in Figure 3.1 where the man is around 25 years older than the woman, but Figure 3.4 shows
that that is exactly where the share of married/married is falling to zero, thus suggesting that here
we have mainly pairs who are not matched to each other.
Couples not living together on June 30th, 2008 are impossible for us to identify with our data;
however, we believe that this situation is likely to be rare.
If the couple lives at a location with more than 2 people with the same last name at the same
coordinate, we have no way of knowing which two people are part of a couple, and so all are dropped
(about 5.2 million).
We drop people who have inconsistent names across data sources, thus potentially omitting
more couples from our sample (about 1.8 million).
We can get a sense of how representative our final sample of couples is by comparing their
characteristics to those of a truly representative sample of couples, those in the micro census. Table
3.6 compares individual characteristics of people in our final sample of couples (column 4) to cou-
ples in the Microcensus in 2011 (column 7). In terms of the age distribution, our men and women
tend to be a bit younger than those in the census couples; this can be explained by the fact that our
sample only includes people in the workforce, so older workers who are more likely to be retired
are excluded. In addition, anyone married to a retired person will be omitted from our final sample,
since their spouse will not be in our original dataset. If we exclude the individuals over age 65
and rescale the Microcensus numbers, they come closer to ours, although still skewed a bit older -
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11% of men are under age 35, 25% between 35 and 45, and 64% between 45 and 65. Similarly for
women, rescaling the Microcensus numbers brings them a bit closer to ours: 15% age less than 35,
26% between age 35 and 45, and 59% between age 45 and 65. If we look only at couples in our
final sample who live at coordinates with exactly 2 people (column 4), the age distribution becomes
even closer (couples living at 2-person locations may be a more accurate sample, since there is less
of a possibility of false matches; it may also favor older couples, who may be more likely to live in
single-family homes rather than multi-family apartment buildings).
Looking next at the labor force status, we do not have the full range of labor force status options
that are available in the micro census, since the IAB data only includes people in the labor force but
omits self-employed and public servants. If we again rescale the census numbers for the categories
that are available in the IEB, we find them to be relatively close to ours 96% employees in the
Microcensus versus 88% employees in our final sample. Again the sample with exactly 2 people in
a location is even closer to the census, with 93% employees.
Turning to Table 3.7, we can compare the characteristics of couples in the different data sets.
The distribution of age difference within couples of our final sample (column 3) is almost exactly
the same as that of the micro census. The couples in our sample are more likely to be both German
and less likely to be both non-German than those of the micro census; as mentioned earlier, non-
Germans are less likely to change their name at marriage than Germans are, and so are more likely to
be omitted by our matching algorithm. Finally, household income tends to be higher in our sample
than in the micro census, although this is likely due to the fact that the census reports net income
while the income data in the IEB is gross. In addition, the Microcensus contains individuals who
are retired or otherwise out of the workforce and therefore likely to have a low or no income, while
our sample includes only those who are in the workforce. Overall, although we miss many couples
in our data set and may mistakenly include some pairs who are not truly married, the couples that
we identify seem fairly similar to the universe of couples in Germany in the below 65 age group
and are likely to be at least roughly representative for couples where both spouses are participating
in a labor market in either employment subject to social security contributions or by receiving UI
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benefits.
3.5 Application: Relative Income Within Households
Next, we use our identified couples to explore the issue of within-couple relative income. This topic
was recently made prominent in the economics literature by Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan in their
forthcoming paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, “Gender Identity and Relative Income
Within Households” (2015). Using a variety of U.S. data, Bertrand et. al. argued that the social
norm “the man should earn more than his wife” has broad impacts across of a range of outcomes,
including patterns of marriage and divorce, women’s labor supply decisions, and the distribution of
home production activities.1 Their starting point was their observation that, for married couples in
the US, the distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp drop at
50%, as seen in Figure 3.6(a). They created this graph using a sample of about 74,000 couples from
the 1990-2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which they were able to link
to administrative data on income from the Social Security Administration and the Internal Revenue
Service.
We start by replicating this graph using the couples we identified in the IEB data. Similar to
Bertrand et. al., we restrict our sample to couples where both the husband and wife are employed
and earning an income.2 The result is shown in Figure 3.6(b). While the levels of the distributions
are slightly different across the two graphs, the drop in the distribution at 50% is relatively similar
in magnitude - around 2 percentage points3. However, given our large sample size we are able to
divide the data into smaller slices to get a more detailed view. If, instead of bins with a size of 0.05
as in Bertrand et. al., we use .01-sized bins for our histogram (see Figure 3.6(c)), we see evidence
1Other researchers, particularly in sociology, have investigated issues regarding relative income within the household,
finding that a wife earning more than her husband is associated with higher divorce risk (Liu and Vikat (2007); Heck-
ert et al. (1998)), the wife doing more housework (Bittman et al., 2003), and increased usage of erectile dysfunction
medication (Pierce et al., 2013).
2We also exclude couples where the husband or wife’s income is top-coded, where the wage difference between
husband and wife is greater than 160 Euros, and where the husband earns less than 30 Euros per day.
3The hump on the left side of the graph is driven by the large share of couples where the wife works in a “mini-job”,
or marginal employment, which pays very low wages but is tax-free.
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of only a small drop at the 50% mark. Similar to the previous two graphs, the shape of the curve
does change to the right of the 50% mark.
Again, our large sample size - more than 2 million couples - allows us to dig deeper. We find that
when we divide our sample even more, any drop in the distribution that we see seems to be driven
entirely by couples where the husband and wife are working in the same establishment (Figure
3.7(a)). Although this group makes up only about 6.5% of the sample, it is for them that we actually
see a large increase in the share of couples where the wife’s income is just under her husband’s,
followed by a big drop in the share where the wife earns just over. For husbands and wives working
in different plants (Figure 3.7(b)), the distribution of wife’s income share looks quite smooth at the
50% mark.
3.5.1 Couple Characteristics
To try to understand why the distribution of wife’s share of household income is so different for
couples who work together and those who do not, we can look at some characteristics of these
couples. First, the distribution of age difference between couples (husband’s age - wife’s age) is
shown in Figure 3.8(a) for couples who work in the same establishment, and 3.8(b) for couples
who work in different establishments. The two distributions look very similar. For both groups,
husbands and wives tend to be close in age, with the husband a few years older. The distribution for
couples in different establishments is slightly more condensed, indicating that these couples may be
less likely to be far apart in age.
Next, we look at the distribution of tenure difference - the difference in how long the husband
and wife have been working for their current employer. The distribution for couples who work
together is shown in Figures 3.8(c) and for couples who work separately in Figure 3.8(d). Almost
30% of couples working in the same plant have the same tenure; for couples working in different
plants, about 12% do. If we exclude couples where both the husband and wife have 0 tenure (Figures
3.8(e) and 3.8(f)), we still see that a large share - about 18% - of couples who work together have
the same number of years of tenure, while only 6% of couples working at different plants do. The
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biggest difference between couples who work together and those who do not is seen on the left side
of the graphs. For couples at the same establishment, there are very few where the wife has been
working there longer than her husband - almost all have been working there the same amount of
time, or the husband has been employed there longer. While for couples who work separately the
husband is still slightly more likely to have more years of tenure than his wife, the graph is much
more symmetric.
3.5.2 Other Dimensions
It’s possible that other variables are driving the relative income differences that we see within plants.
For example, we compare the relative income distribution for couples who work at the same estab-
lishment and are the same age (Figure 3.9(a)) or different ages (Figure 3.9(b)), but find almost no
difference in the distributions. Next, in Figures 3.9(c) and 3.9(d) we compare the relative income
distributions for couples with the same tenure at their firm to that of couples with differing tenure
(all for couples where the husband and wife are at the same establishment). Couples with the same
tenure exhibit a much larger spike in the relative income distribution at 50%, followed by a drop.
Finally, we compare couples with the same level of education (Figure 3.9(e)) to those with different
education (Figure 3.9(f)), and find a similar spike and drop at 50% for couples with the same edu-
cation, with less of a pronounced cliff at 50% for couples with different education levels. Overall,
within establishments, when couples are more similar - in terms of tenure and education - we are
much more likely to see the wife earning slightly less than her husband than earning slightly more.
3.5.3 Information
One potential explanation for why couples who work in the same establishment exhibit a sharp
drop in the distribution of wife’s share of household income at 50% is that, if gender norms such as
those discussed in Bertrand et. al. do matter, they are most salient for couples who work together.
These couples are likely to have better information about each other’s jobs and, importantly, their
salaries, so these gender norms may be strongest for them. To test this, we look at other types of
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couples that are likely to have better information about each other’s jobs. For example, we look
at couples who work in the same industry (but different establishment), and find no evidence of a
change at 50% (Figure 3.10(a)) - the distribution looks smooth. Couples who are employed in the
same occupation, but different industry and establishment, are shown in Figure 3.10(b). The relative
income distribution for these couples is more jagged, but they also exhibit no sharp discontinuity at
50%. In Figure 3.10(c), we look at couples who, despite working at different establishments, have
very similar jobs - in the same industry and same occupation - and here we see that the distribution
drops off more rapidly after the halfway mark, although without the sharp increase just below 50%
that we saw in the same-establishment couples. In addition, there isn’t a large drop at the 50% mark;
instead, the slope of the distribution appears to change at that point. Therefore, it does not appear
that better information about one’s spouse’s job or income is the primary driver of the graphs we
have seen.
3.5.4 Discussion
On the surface, the distribution of relative household income in Germany looks similar to what was
seen in the US in Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015). However, using our large sample of matched
couples, we are able to dig deeper and find that any drop in the distribution that we see at the 50%
mark appears to be driven primarily by couples who are working at the same establishment, who
make up about 6% of the sample. It is not entirely clear why this is the case. Couples who work
together do not look very different from those who are not in terms of age difference or education
difference (68% of couples who work at the same establishment have the same level of education,
while 63% of those who do not work together have the same education). These couples are very
likely to be working at their establishment for the same amount of time, and it is extremely unlikely
for the wife to have been working there longer than her husband. It is possible that the workplace
functions as a very particular type of marriage market, and within this marriage market gender
norms matter more, with the husband typically being more senior and having a higher salary than
his wife. This does not seem to be driven simply by better information about one’s spouse’s job
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or salary, since other couples who would have similar information - those who work in the same
industry and/or occupation - don’t show evidence of the same kind of patterns. Another possibility is
that information is part of the story, but in a different way: not the information the couple has about
each other, but rather the information that others in their social circle have. Maybe what matters
is not whether your wife earns more than you, but whether your friends know that your wife earns
more - which is more likely to occur if you all work together.4 Future work including a panel of
couples, which will be possible once further geocoding of the data is completed and couples can be
identified in additional years, could help provide more information on how these individuals meet
and how long they stay together, providing additional insight on the differences between couples
who work at the same establishment and those who do not.
3.6 Conclusion
We present a method for identifying a very large number of pairs of individuals who are likely
married to each other in the German administrative data. While room for type 1 (false positives)
and type 2 (false negatives) errors exists, our analysis suggests that our final sample still contains
about 89 to 94 percent true couples and that we have a fairly representative sample of couples where
both individuals would be covered in the Integrated Employment Biographies. The method appears
accurate enough to open the door for future research projects analyzing research questions in labor
and public economics that rely on household (couple) identifiers using administrative data. The
particular strength of this data will undoubtedly be the very large sample sizes possible with this ap-
proach as well as the possibility to link the cross-sectional information to longitudinal employment
histories. We finish by using the identified couples to examine the topic of within-couple relative
income; our large sample size allows us to look at small intervals in the relative wage distribution
and interesting subgroups of couples, and we find differing patterns for couples who work in the
same establishment and those who do not. Although it is not immediately apparent why this is the
case, this application points to the importance of having a large, high-quality sample for this and
4unfortunately with the current data we have no way to test this idea
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other types of research in labor economics.
128
Figure 3.1: Distribution of age differences of matches, male/female
Note: Includes all male-female pairs of individuals who we were able to match by location and name
(according to our name-matching algorithm). Age difference is calculated as man’s age-woman’s age.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of age differences of matches, female/female
Note: Includes all female-female pairs of individuals who we were able to match by location and name
(according to our name-matching algorithm). Age difference is calculated as older age-younger age.
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of age differences of matches, male/male
Note: Includes all male-male pairs of individuals who we were able to match by location and name
(according to our name-matching algorithm). Age difference is calculated as older age-younger age.
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Figure 3.4: Share of matched pairs listed as married-married or married-missing
Note: Includes all male-female pairs of individuals who we were able to match by location and name
(according to our name-matching algorithm), and where at least one member has the family status variable
filled in. Age difference is calculated as man’s age-wife’s age.
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Figure 3.5: Share of matched pairs listed as married-married or married-missing - 2 people at a
coordinate
Note: Includes all male-female pairs of individuals who we were able to match by location and name
(according to our name-matching algorithm), and where at least one member has the family status variable
filled in. Restricted to couples living at coordinates where exactly 2 people are located. Age difference is
calculated as man’s age-wife’s age.
132
Figure 3.6: Distribution of Wife’s Contribution to Household Income - US and GermanyFigure I: Distribution of relative income (SIPP Administrative Data)
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 co
up
les
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share earned by the wife
Notes: The data is from the 1990 to 2004 SIPP/SSA/IRS gold standard files. The sample includes
married couples where both the husband and wife earn positive income and are between 18 and 65
years of age. For each couple, we use the observation from the first year that the couple is in the
panel. Each dot is the fraction of couples in a 0.05 relative income bin. The vertical line indicates
the relative income share = 0.5. The dashed line is the lowess smoother applied to the distribution
allowing for a break at 0.5.
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couples where both partners are employed.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of Wife’s Contribution to Household Income by Establish-
ment Status
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Notes: Created using matched couples from German data.
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of Age and Tenure Difference
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Figure 3.9: Distribution of Share of Wife’s Contribution to Household Income -
Husband and Wife at Same Establishment
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Notes: Figures are created using matched couples from German data. Wife’s share of
household income is calculated as wife’s income divided by sum of husband’s and wife’s
income. Includes couples where both partners are employed at the same establishment.
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Figure 3.10: Distribution of Share of Wife’s Contribution to Household Income
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Notes: Figures are created using matched couples from German data. Wife’s share of
household income is calculated as wife’s income divided by sum of husband’s and wife’s
income. Includes couples where both partners are employed.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of the Number of Individuals at the Same
Coordinate
Number of Number of
Individuals on a Total Number of Individuals with Percent
Coordinate Individuals Matched Names Matched
1 4,956,761
2 7,443,038 5,082,600 68.29%
3 4,911,162 1,024,758 20.87%
4 3,061,944 651,742 21.29%
5 1,998,695 473,896 23.71%
6 1,589,814 396,944 24.97%
7 1,345,134 347,244 25.81%
8 1,154,712 305,390 26.45%
9 971,325 259,734 26.74%
10 807,360 219,600 27.2%
11 673,090 182,466 27.11%
12 548,928 147,280 26.83%
13 451,828 120,658 26.7%
14 366,646 96,724 26.38%
15 304,245 79,844 26.24%
16 254,032 66,272 26.09%
17 209,984 53,700 25.57%
18 177,840 45,022 25.32%
19 151,734 37,638 24.81%
20 131,940 32,064 24.3%
>20 1,540,207 372,596 24.19%
Total 33,050,419 9,996,172 30.25%
Notes: Second column includes all geocoded data as of June 30th
2008. Third column includes all individuals with geocoded location
for whom we were able to match according to our name-matching
algorithm, described in the text.
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Table 3.2: Examples of the Name-Matching Pro-
cedure
Example A
Number of
Individuals on a Potential
Coordinate Last Name Couple
5 COHLE match
5 HART match
5 COHLE match
5 MEIER no match
5 HART match
⇒ matches HART and COHLE are chosen
Example B
Number of
Individuals on a Potential
Coordinate Last Name Couple
5 COHLE no match
5 HART match
5 COHLE no match
5 COHLE no match
5 HART-MEIER match
⇒ match (HART-)MEIER is chosen
Example C
Number of
Individuals on a Potential
Coordinate Last Name Couple
5 COHLE-MEIER no match
5 MEIER no match
5 COHLE no match
5 COHLE no match
5 MEIER-MUELLER no match
⇒ no match is chosen
Notes: These are provided as examples only, and are
not taken from the actual data.
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Table 3.3: Gender Composition of Matched Potential Couples
All Matches Age Difference <15 Age Difference ≥15
Composition absolute percent absolute percent absolute percent
male/female 4,084,516 81.72% 3,281,657 94.65% 802,859 52.44%
male/male 482,891 9.66% 131,550 3.79% 351,341 22.95%
female/female 430,679 8.62% 53,763 1.55% 376,916 24.62%
Total 4,998,086 100.00% 3,466,970 100.00% 1,531,116 100.00%
Notes: Includes all individuals with geocoded location as of June 30, 2008 who we were
able to match according to our name-matching algorithm, described in the text.
Table 3.4: Distribution of Family Status Across Indi-
viduals
Family Status Absolute Percent Accumulated
living alone 340,722 3.41% 3.41%
cohabiting 113,153 1.13% 4.54%
single parent 109,783 1.1% 5.64%
married 986,480 9.87% 15.51%
missing 8,446,034 84.49% 100.00%
Total 9,996,172 100.00%
Notes: Includes all individuals who we were able to match
by location and name (according to our name-matching
algorithm) as of June 30, 2008. Only individuals who are
registered as job-seekers have the family status variable
filled in.
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Table 3.5: Family Status Composition of Matched Couples
Opposite Sex Same Sex
Age Diff<15 Age Diff≥15 Age Diff<15 Age Diff≥15
Composition absolute percent absolute percent absolute percent absolute percent
both alone 5,762 0.89% 9,073 3.98% 9,854 17.65% 6,987 3.51%
alone-miss. 26,692 4.11% 69,514 30.5% 28,148 50.43% 61,258 30.76%
alone-cohabit 3,124 0.48% 6,066 2.66% 2,538 4.55% 5,197 2.61%
alone-sngl par 1,795 0.28% 16,050 7.04% 594 1.06% 14,573 7.32%
alone-marr. 9,207 1.42% 15,670 6.88% 1,391 2.49% 15,553 7.81%
both cohabit 3,248 0.50% 2,401 1.05% 1,337 2.40% 2,197 1.10%
cohabit-miss. 7,001 1.08% 13,607 5.97% 4,331 7.76% 12,815 6.44%
cohabit-sngl par 757 0.12% 9,500 4.17% 196 0.35% 9,348 4.69%
cohabit-marr. 5,870 0.90% 6,764 2.97% 303 0.54% 7,370 3.70%
both sngl par 85 0.01% 58 0.03% 219 0.39% 399 0.20%
sngl par-miss. 5,331 0.82% 22,240 9.76% 1,595 2.86% 21,261 10.68%
sngl par-marr. 2,683 0.41% 1,055 0.46% 136 0.24% 1,147 0.58%
both married 229,279 35.29% 8,078 3.54% 637 1.14% 1,111 0.56%
marr.-miss. 348,809 53.69% 47,851 20.99% 4,536 8.13% 39,925 20.05%
both missing 2632014 574932 129498 529116
Total 3281657 802859 185313 728257
Notes: Includes all couples who we were able to match by location and name (according to our name-
matching algorithm) as of June 30, 2008. Only individuals who are registered as job-seekers have the family
status variable filled in.
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Table 3.6: Summary Statistics at the Individual Level
All IEB Data Final Matched Sample Microcensus
2 People 2 People >2 People
at Coord at Coord at Coord
Number of Indiv
at Coordinate 6.44 2.0 5.65 2.0 9.53
Age of Husband
<35 .33 .24 .12 .07 .17 .08
≥ 35 and <45 .26 .28 .31 .33 .29 .18
≥ 45 and <65 .39 .45 .54 .57 .51 .44
≥ 65 .03 .03 .03 .03 .03 .31
Age of Wife
<35 .31 .23 .17 .11 .23 .12
≥ 35 and <45 .25 .30 .34 .39 .29 .20
≥ 45 and <65 .42 .44 .47 .48 .47 .45
≥ 65 .02 .02 .01 .01 .02 .24
Labor Force Status
In Labor Force .64
Self-Employed .10
Public Servant .04
Family Workers 0.00
Employee .84 .90 .88 .93 .83 .47
Unemployed .13 .08 .10 .06 .13 .02
Not in Labor Force .36
Education
Secondary / Intermed.
School Certificate .78 .80 .82 .81 .83 .71
Upper
Secondary School .21 .21 .18 .20 .17 .25
Living in
East Germany .15 .15 .17 .16 .17
Number of
Observations 33050419 7443038 6563314 3384124 3179190 36016000
Notes: First four columns include individuals from the IEB data as of June 30, 2008. “Final Matched
Sample” includes male-female pairs with same geo-coded location, same name, and age difference of
less than 15 years, as described in the text. Last column includes data from Microcensus as of 2011.
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics at the Couple Level
All M/F
Matches Final Matched Sample Microcensus
2 People at >2 People at
All Coordinate Coordinate
Age Difference
No Age Difference .08 .10 .11 .10 .10
≥ 1 and <4 years .41 .51 .52 .49 .48
≥ 4 and <7 years .20 .25 .25 .25 .25
≥ 7 and <11 years .09 .11 .10 .12 .12
≥ 11 and <16 years .03 .03 .03 .04 .04
≥ 16 years .19 0.00 0.00 0.00 .02
Nationality
Both German .90 .90 .96 .83 .86
One German .06 .07 .03 .10 .07
Both Non-German .04 .04 .01 .06 .07
Monthly Household Income
<1300 .09 .08 .05 .10 .07
≥ 1300 and <3200 .19 .17 .15 .20 .53
≥ 3200 .72 .75 .80 .70 .34
Number of
Observations 4,084,516 3,281,657 1,692,062 1,589,595 18,008,000
Notes: First four columns include individuals from the IEB data as of June 30, 2008. First
column includes male-female pairs with matched last name and coordinate. Columns 2-4
include male-female pairs with same geo-coded location, same name, and age difference of less
than 15 years, as described in the text. Last column includes data from Microcensus as of 2011.
Monthly household income is gross for IEB data and net for Microcensus data.
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